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I. Introduction 
 
The globalization process does not permit a country that wishes to be involved in this 
process to take an independent stand in choosing its tax system, especially with respect to 
financial transactions. 1 Choosing tax rules that are unacceptable in the world’s leading 
countries could adversely affect an economy’s competitiveness in the world’s capital 
markets.2 The growth in international capital movements is a contributory factor in this 
respect.3
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Washington, D.C. As a senior manager at Ernst & Young, he specializes in United States taxation of 
financial products and institutions. He received his M.P.A. and I.T.P (International Taxation) from 
Harvard, LL.M. (Taxation), and S.J.D from the University of Michigan. 
1 See Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (1998), para 21 (Hereinafter “OECD Report 
(1998)”) (“Globalisation has also been one of the driving forces behind tax reforms, which have focused on 
base broadening and rate reductions, thereby minimising tax induced distortions. Globalisation has also 
encouraged countries to assess continually their tax systems and public expenditures with a view to making 
adjustments where appropriate to improve the ‘fiscal climate’ for investment. Globalisation and the 
increased mobility of capital has also promoted the development of capital and financial markets and has 
encouraged countries to reduce tax barriers to capital flows and to modernise their tax systems to reflect 
these developments. Many of these reforms have also addressed the need to adapt tax systems to this new 
global environment.”). 
2 Id. para 22 (“The process of globalisation has led to increased competition among businesses in the global 
market place.”). 
3 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, : Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis Of The Welfare State 
113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573, 1575-6 (2000) (Hereinafter “Avi Yonah (2000)”) (“The mobility of capital has 
2In 1923, a committee comprised of four economists submitted a report to the League of 
Nations that set forth the basic principles underlying international tax principles, most of 
which still prevail today. 4 Upon the issuance of the League of Nations Report in 1923, 
two generally recognized regimes for international tax have emerged – residency (or 
global) and source (or territorial).5 In a residency-based tax regime, residents are taxed on 
their worldwide income.6 In contrast, in a territorial regime, residents are not taxed on 
foreign source income and foreign taxpayers are taxed on income generated in the source 
country.7 Over the years, however, there has been a significant degree of convergence 
among countries; most tax jurisdictions, whether developed or developing, use both 
 
resulted in international tax competition, in which sovereign countries aim to attract both portfolio and 
direct investment by lowering their tax rates on income earned by foreigners.”); Edwards, Chris and de 
Rugy, Veronique, International Tax Competition: A 21st-Century Restraint on Government, 27 Tax Notes 
Int'l 63, 67 (2002) (Hereinafter “Edwards and de Rugy (2002)”) (“World economies have become more 
tightly integrated in recent decades. Rapid growth in cross-border investment has been a key dimension of 
that integration. In past decades, many countries erected barriers to foreign investment, but today most 
countries realize that foreign investment means new jobs, new factories, and access to leading-edge 
technology. As a result governments have removed the shackles they once placed on international 
investment flows.”). 
4 See Report on Double Taxation, Submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors Bruins, Einaudi, 
Seligman, and Sir Josiah Stamp, League of Nations Doc. No. E.F.S. 73.F.19, 40 (1923) (Hereinafter 
“League of Nations Report (1923)”). Professor Hugh Ault defines this report as “the intellectual base from 
which modern treaties developed.”  See Hugh J. Ault, Colloquium on Corporate Integration: Corporate 
Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the International Tax Base: Principles and Practices, 47 Tax 
L. Rev. 565 (1992) (Hereinafter “Ault (1992)”).  
5 See Jeffrey M. Colon, Financial Products And Source Basis Taxation: U.S. International Tax Policy At 
The Crossroads, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 775, 780 (Hereinafter “Colon (1999)”). 
6 See Gregory May, The U.S. Taxation of Derivative Contracts, 95 TNI 189-8 (This article is an updated 
version of the national report published in 85b Cahiers de Droit Fiscal International 615 (1995) for the 49th 
Congress of the International Fiscal Association on September 17-21, 1995, hereafter “May (1995)”).   
7 Id. See also generally Reuven S. Avi Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A 
Proposal for Simplification, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1301 (1996) (Hereinafter “Avi Yonah (1996)”).  
 
3source and residence taxation to some extent.8 Most countries follow an “international 
tax regime” in both their internal laws and tax treaties.9
The question addressed by this article is whether a developing country (hereinafter 
“Country D”) is better off adopting a source-based or residency-based taxation regime (or 
a combination thereof) for cross-border financial transactions.10 Financial transactions 
add an important dimension to the general conflict between source-based and residency-
based regimes since money is fungible.11 Thus, when a non-resident wishes to invest 
overseas, the investor can easily switch from one country to another, and will do so if the 
tax rules in Country D could result in a heavier tax burden.12 
Nevertheless, for developing countries, choosing between source-based and residency-
based taxation is not easy.13 On the one hand, a source-based regime would allow 
Country D to keep more tax revenues from non-residents.14 Assuming that Country D 
has source rules similar to the most other countries with respect to financial transactions, 
a source-based regime, would, therefore, allow Country D to tax income derived by non-
 
8 Avi Yonah (1996), at 1303-05 (describing this process as the creation of an “international tax regime.”).      
9 Id. at 1303 (“[A] coherent international tax regime exists that enjoys nearly universal support and that 
underlies the complexities of the international aspects of individual countries' tax systems.”) 
10 See generally Avi Yonah (2000) at 1639-48 (discussing the pros and cons of the two alternatives); Victor 
Thuronyi Taxation of New Financial Instruments, 24 Tax Notes Int'l 261 (2001) (Hereinafter “Thuronyi 
(2001)”).    
11 Id. See also Yaron Reich Taxing Foreign Investors' Portfolio Investments: Developments and 
Discontinuities, 98 TNT 114-71 (Hereinafter “Reich (1998)”) (“One important policy consideration would 
seem to favor having the source country forgo the taxation of passive income, particularly portfolio 
investment income. Investment capital is highly mobile, and investors often can choose from among 
alternative investment opportunities around the world.”).   
12 Edwards and de Rugy (2002) at 67 (“Portfolio flows can be shifted in and out of foreign investments 
quickly and are more sensitive to short-term returns than is FDI.”).  
13 See Avi Yonah (2000) at 1639-48. As to financial transactions in particular, see Thuronyi (2001).    
14 Avi Yonah (2000) at 1640-41 (discussing the need for tax revenues in developing countries). 
4residents from interest and dividends.15 On the other hand, non-residents from countries 
that have residency based taxation regime would be less inclined to invest in Country D, 
since their home country would impose tax on such non-residents’ activity in Country D, 
and this might result in double taxation (if no applicable treaty applies, and there is no 
other relief for double taxation).16 Furthermore, as set forth below, residency-based 
taxation promotes Capital Export Neutrality (CEN).17 As this article concludes, the 
adoption of residency-based taxation for financial transactions by developing countries 
would benefit Country D.18 
Residency-based taxation for financial transactions is generally consistent with the 
principle established by the League of Nations Report (1923) pursuant to which passive 
income should generally be taxed by the residency country.19 Residency-based taxation 
for financial transactions would also make Country D’s tax rules consistent with the 
current rules in the majority of developed countries (see Table 1 below), and reduce 
compliance costs, since the source-based taxation on interest and dividend income earned 
by nonresidents is very impractical in many instances.  Residence-based taxation, 
 
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 1641-48. 
17 See Avi Yonah (2000) at 1605, quoting Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, International Tax Competition and 
Gains from Tax Harmonization, 37 Econ. Letters 69, 69-70 (1991) (“If a country adopts the residence 
principle, taxing at the same rate capital income from all sources, then the gross return accruing to an 
individual in that country must be the same, regardless of which country is the source of that return. Thus, 
the marginal product of capital in that country will be equal to the world return to capital. If all countries 
adopt the residence principle, then capital income taxation does not disturb the equality of the marginal 
product of capital across countries which is generated by a free movement of capital.”). 
18 Id. at 1582 (“The standard economic advice to small, open economies is to avoid taxing capital income at 
its source, because the tax will be shifted forward to the borrowers and result in higher domestic interest 
rates.”). 
19 See Ault (1992) at 568 (stating that in the League of Nations Report (1923), “the right to tax business 
income, including the income of affiliated companies, was assigned to the source state. The right to tax 
income from business securities, however, was assigned exclusively to the residence state.”).  
5however, would shift revenue from developing to developed countries in the short-run, 
but as discussed below, it would benefit Country D in the long-run. 
 
In adopting residency-based taxation regime for financial transactions for purposes of 
encouraging foreign investment, Country D would not be alone.20 “Over the last eighty 
years, the United States has encouraged passive foreign investment in U.S. capital 
markets by generally exempting foreign investors from U.S. tax on all income arising 
from dealings in U.S. debt and equity securities. [footnote omitted] This tax policy 
reflects a view that the benefits from increased foreign investment, such as lowering the 
cost of capital for U.S. firms and increased market liquidity, outweigh any foregone tax 
revenue.”21 Similar preferences have been included in tax treaties to which the United 
States is a party.22 
Part II of this article describes the fundamentals of source based and residency based 
taxation in general and for financial transactions in particular.   Part III is divided into 
three chapters, each of which discusses one of the following tax issues: (i) taxation of 
portfolio interest and dividends and capital gains earned by nonresidents; (ii) taxation of 
cross-border derivatives; and (iii) taxation of non-residents trading or investing in 
securities in Country D.   
 
20 See Table 1 below (describing the withholding rates for interest and dividend income earned by non-
resident in several countries).    
21 See Colon (1999) at 783.  
22 Id. at 785 (“The favorable tax treatment of foreign investment reflected in the Internal Revenue Code 
also parallels the favorable tax treatment ac corded passive foreign investment income in bilateral income 
tax treaties, which generally exempt or significantly reduce source basis taxation on investment income 
earned by foreign persons.”).  
6The United States has recognized the need to attract foreign lenders when it enacted the 
portfolio interest exemption in 1984.23 In addition, the United States has enacted other 
provisions that exempt portfolio investment including: (i) the exemption for interest paid 
on bank deposits,24 (ii) the exemption for original issue discount ("OID") on a debt 
obligation having an original maturity of 183 days or less,25 and (iii) the exemption for 
most capital gains of foreign investors.26 As discussed in greater detail below, many 
countries have followed the United States in enacting low or zero withholding tax on 
interest paid to non-residents.27 
As intended, the enactment of the portfolio interest exemption has resulted in a 
significant increase in portfolio investment in the United States.28 Chapter III(B) 
proposes an exemption for portfolio investment in bonds AND stock of domestic 
corporations; if Country D wishes to encourage foreign investors to lend money to 
domestic companies or to invest in such companies’ stock, it should exempt portfolio 
interest and dividends income derived by such foreign investor as well as capital gains on 
sales of such instruments.29 
23 Sections 871(h); 881(c). All “Section” references in this article are to the United States Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”) or, when in the form “Treas. Reg. §,” to Treasury regulations 
thereunder. 
24 Sections 871(i); 881(d). 
25 Section 871(g)(1)(B)(i). 
26 Sections 871(a)(2), 881(a). 
27 See Table 1 below. See, also Avi Yonah (2000) at 1581 ( “The United States's enactment of the portfolio 
interest exemption has resulted in a classic ‘race to the bottom.’ One after another, all the major economies 
have abolished their withholding taxes on interest for fear of losing mobile capital flows to the United 
States.”).  
28 Avi Yonah (1996) at 1315; Edwards and de Rugy (2002) at 86. 
29 Edwards and de Rugy (2002) at 86 (For this purpose, “The term portfolio investments is used . . . to 
describe investments in stocks and debt and other securities of U.S. issuers (and derivatives relating 
thereto) by non-U.S. persons that do not directly, indirectly, or constructively own a substantial equity 
7The United States has yet to adopt portfolio dividend exemption, but this article suggests 
that Country D will apply equal treatment for income from interest and dividends.30 With 
respect to capital gains from selling bonds and stock of local companies (other than 
inventory), most countries including the United States have viewed the source of such 
gains and losses as the seller’s residency, and Part II of this article will suggest that 
Country D adopt this principle (again, leaving the sole jurisdiction to tax capital gains to 
the residency country).31 
Chapter III(C) discusses taxation rules for cross-border derivatives.32 In general, 
derivatives are mainly used for either hedging33 or speculation purposes.  With respect to 
hedging, it is generally accepted that risk management is a crucial element in every 
business’s growth.34 Thus, Country D would clearly want to encourage local businesses 
 
interest in the U.S. issuer, where such investments are not effectively connected with a U.S. trade or 
business of such non-U.S. persons.”). 
30 See Reich (1998) (advocating a portfolio dividend exemption in the United States); Merrill, Peter R., 
Patrick, Robert J. Abd Belanger, Pete, Tax Treaties in A Global Economy: The Case For Zero Withholding 
On Direct Dividends, 5 Tax Notes Int'l 1387, 1389 (Hereinafter “Merrill et. al”) (“The recent proliferation 
of free trade areas bolsters the argument for zero withholding on direct dividends. The full benefits of an 
integrated regional market require elimination of barriers to capital flows -- including withholding taxes -- 
as well as trade flows.”).  
31 See generally Section 865(a).   
32 See, generally, David Rosenbloom, Source-Basis Taxation of Derivative Financial Instruments: Some 
Unanswered Questions, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 597 (1996) (Hereinafter “Rosenbloom (1996)”). See also 
May (1995).   
33 Rosenbloom (1996) at 597-98 (“A derivative financial instrument is a device used to shift risk from one 
party to another. On this fundamental point, derivatives resemble insurance, a concept familiar to anyone 
who has purchased a vehicle or home. In an insurance transaction one party pays a fee, or premium, to 
another. In return, the other party undertakes the risk of paying the first party up to a specified amount in 
the event of a specified occurrence (such as a theft or fire). If the occurrence comes to pass, the first party 
has a claim against the second, which gives value to the insurance contract. That value depends on, or 
derives from, the occurrence, which is typically beyond the influence or control of either party, and the 
extent of the resulting loss. If the occurrence does not come to pass, the contract expires without having any 
value to the first party. Yet, such a transaction is sensible because, during the specified period, the insured 
was relieved of the risk of suffering loss as a result of the specified event by shifting the economic burden 
of that risk to the insurer.”). 
34 Colon (1999) at 777 (“Financial instruments permit firms to transfer financial price risks to other 
investors better able or more willing to bear such risks. Financial instruments help firms to lower their 
8to manage their risk by entering into derivatives with foreign counterparties (assuming 
that the local banks could not satisfy this need).35 Nevertheless, foreign counterparties 
will hesitate to enter into hedging transactions with domestic businesses in Country D if 
income from such transactions will be subject to tax in the source country.36 This article 
will suggest, therefore, that Country D establish that income from derivatives used for 
hedging would be taxed by the residency country of the recipient of the income.37 Once 
again, the United States has adopted similar source rules for periodic income from 
notional principal contracts, with the clear purpose of allowing domestic business more 
access to the foreign derivatives markets.38 As for other derivative contracts (options, 
forwards and futures), there are no specific rules, but in general, the income from such 
contracts is taxed by the residency country.39 The result is that income from all types of 
derivative contracts that is not effectively connected to a trade or business is rarely taxed 
by the source country.40 This will be my suggestion for Country D as well.  With regard 
to derivatives entered into for speculation purposes, these rules would be covered under 
the proposal for securities trading set forth below.   
 
financing costs and hedge more efficiently in both specific transactions, such as the purchase or sale of 
products in foreign currency, as well as in strategic cash flow hedging.”).  
35 See generally Tax Aspects of Derivative Financial Instruments, 49th IFA Cong. Res. (Cannes 1995) 
(Hereinafter “IFA Report (1995)”). See Thuronyi  (2001) at 264.  
36 Id.  
37 Id. See e.g., Treas. Reg. 1.863-7(b) for a similar rule in the United States (that only applies to periodic 
payments on notional principal contracts). See also similar rules in Canada and the United Kingdom 
discussed below; Rosenbloom (1996) at 603 (stating that the “international consensus” is that the source 
country does not impose tax on income from derivatives earned by non-residents). 
38 See Reich (1998) (“The rules for determining the source of income from notional principal contracts 
offer another example of the favorable tax treatment of foreign investors.”).   
39 See Reuven S. Avi Yonah and Linda Swartz, U.S. International Tax Treatment of Financial Derivatives,
97 TNT 64-91 (Hereinafter “Avi Yonah and Swartz (1997)”) (discussing the source rules for derivatives in 
the United States and generally concluding that the United States rarely taxed income from derivatives 
earned by non-residents, unless such income is effectively connected to a US trade or business).   
40 The only notable exceptions are significant nonperiodic payments that are treated as embedded loans 
and, therefore, are sourced according to the residence of the payor.  See Id.  
9I would also suggest that that tax treaties include similar provisions. As of today, only a 
few countries have source rules for income from derivatives, and tax treaties still do not 
address the allocation of tax on such income.41 My proposal would, therefore, be that 
treaties contain a specific provision to deal with income from derivative transactions.   
 
Chapter III(D) discusses taxation rules applicable to those non-residents who generally 
invest or trade (as opposed to deal) in securities (including derivatives) in Country D.  In 
general, participation of non-residents in the domestic securities markets will clearly 
increase the quantity and quality of trades in the domestic markets. Such an enhancement 
in the capital markets’ activity would clearly benefit all investors in Country D’s capital 
markets, domestic and nonresidents, since it will make the markets more liquid and 
efficient. Having liquid and efficient capital markets has been viewed as an important 
element in developing countries’ economic growth.  The United States has also 
recognized the benefit of foreign participants in the domestic stock markets and 
determined that such activity does not constitute a U.S. trade or business.42 This article 
will suggest a similar approach; Country D should establish that all income from trading 
in securities, including capital gains, interest, dividends, and income from derivatives, 
would be taxed by the residency country.  
 
Part IV discusses the question whether the above three suggestions would result in 
Country D’s engagement in a “harmful tax competition,” using the principles set forth by 
 
41 See May (1995); Thuronyi (2001).  
42 See section 864(b)(2)(A) and (B). See also Linda Carlisle,  Derivatives Trading Now Has a "Safe 
Harbor", 16 J. Tax'n Inv. 178 (1999) (“Since the Revenue Act of 1936, the U.S. tax laws have encouraged 
foreign investors to conduct securities and commodities trading activities in the U.S. by providing "safe 
harbors' that exempt gains realized from such trading activities from U.S. tax.”).  
10
the OECD in its 1998 landmark report on harmful tax competition.43 I conclude in this 
part that if Country D adopts my suggestions, it will not be treated as engaging in harmful 
tax competition. 
 
Part V will conclude that to sustain economic growth, country D should adopt residency-
based taxation for financial transactions, which would allow it to attract foreign investors. 
In particular, the benefits for the developing country would be: (i) allowing domestic 
companies to raise capital by issuing bonds or stock to foreign investors, for lower 
finance costs; (ii) allowing domestic companies access to the global derivatives markets, 
which will enhance their risk management activity; and (iii) allowing nonresidents more 
access to the domestic capital markets, which would enhance the efficiency and liquidity 
of the markets.   
 
II. Basic Principles of International Tax Rules 
A. Overview
The fundamental distinction underlying the international tax regime of every country is 
between residency-based (or global) regime and source-based (or territorial) regime.44 
Every tax jurisdiction must, therefore, make a choice between one of these two regimes 
 
43 OECD Report (1998).  
44 See, generally, the League of Nations Report (1923), which established two bases for a country's 
imposition of tax: where income is produced (the source jurisdiction) and where it is consumed or saved 
(the residence jurisdiction).  Id. at 25.  See also Colon (1999) at 780. 
11
or a combination thereof. Graetz and O’Hear (1997) described the basic dilemma of 
international taxation that each country faces as follows: 
 
Despite the seismic changes in the world economy that have occurred in 
the last seven decades, the fundamental dilemma of international taxation 
that confronted Thomas Sewall Adams, his Treasury colleagues, and the 
Congress in the infancy of the income tax remains essentially unchanged. 
When income is earned in one country by a citizen or resident of another 
country, both the country where income is earned (the source country) and 
the country where the investor or earner resides (the residence country) 
have legitimate claims to tax the income. The basic task of international 
tax rules is to resolve the competing claims of residence and source 
nations in order to avoid the double taxation that results when both fully 
exercise their taxing power.45 
The influential League of Nations Report (1923) established the "doctrine of economic 
allegiance" principle pursuant to which there are four sources for justification of taxation: 
(1) Production of wealth; (2) Possession of wealth; (3) Enforcement of rights over 
property; and (4) Disposition of wealth.46 The League of Nations Report (1923) gave 
equal treatment to all four, but as of today, most countries apply only one of the two 
regimes: residency or source, or a combination thereof.47 
45 Michael J. Graetz  and Michael M. O'Hear, The’Original Intent’ of U.S. International Taxation, 46 Duke 
L.J. 1021, 1033 (1997) (Hereinafter “Graetz and O’Hear (1997)”) 
46 League of Nations Report (1923) at 25.  
47 See Avi Yonah (1996), at footnote 10.  
12
The League of Nations Report (1923) also discussed the issue of double taxation.48 
Obviously, if all countries apply the same regime (or if all countries sign tax treaties with 
each other), then double taxation will never arise. Nevertheless, since countries are free to 
choose whatever regime they want, and the treaty network is still incomplete, then double 
taxation will frequently arise. The classic double taxation situation arises when a resident 
of Country B (whose international tax regime is residency-based regime) derives income 
that is sourced in country D.49 In this case, Country D would most likely wish to tax such 
income as the source country, while Country B would wish to tax the same income as the 
residency country. In the absence of a treaty, the taxpayer could be subject to double 
taxation on the same exact income.   
 
The League of Nations Report (1923) generally concluded that the source country should 
have the first priority to tax income derived therein because it can generally impose its 
taxes on income deriving from within it first.50 Nevertheless, the League of Nations 
Report (1923) also suggested that income items should be classified according to whether 
the primary economic activity giving rise to the income takes place in the source country 
 
48 League of Nations Report (1923) at 40-42. 
49 Other two potential double taxation situations are: (i) residence-residence: when two countries can claim 
residence as jurisdiction on the same individual or corporation; and (ii) source-source: when two countries 
each claim to be the source of the income. This could arise if income is derived from a process that takes 
place in more than one country. Those are the ones that are most difficult to resolve, as a practical matter, 
and usually result in actual double taxation. 
50 League of Nations Report (1923) at 40 ("A survey of the whole field of recent taxation shows how 
completely Governments are dominated by the desire to tax the foreigner... From this flows the 
consequence that, when double taxation is involved, Governments would be prepared to give up residence 
rather than origin as establishing the prime right."). 
13
or in the residence country.51 This division is generally referred to as between active and 
passive income (discussed in greater below).52 
B. Source-Based and Residency-Based Taxation 
In a residency-based tax regime, residents are taxed on their worldwide income, while 
non-residents are taxed only on their income derived in the source country.53 Examples of 
countries utilizing this regime are the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom.54 In 
contrast, in the case of source-based taxation, residents are not taxed on foreign source 
income and non-residents are taxed on income generated in the source country. 55 
Examples of countries utilizing the source-based regime are France and the 
Netherlands.56 Nevertheless, most countries apply a combination of these two regimes.57 
Global regimes very frequently allow for deferral or an exemption for active income that 
is earned through foreign subsidiaries; thus, certain foreign source income is not taxed by 
global regimes.58 In addition, there are certain forms of foreign source passive income of 
residents that are taxed even by territorial regimes.  
 
51 Id. at 40-2. 
52 Id. See generally Avi Yonah (1996).  
53 Daniel Frisch, The Economics of International Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches, Tax Notes, 
Apr. 30, 1990, p. 581 (Hereinafter “Frisch (1990)”); Colon (1999) at 780; Rosenbloom (1996) at 605-6. 
54 See Frisch (1990). See also Edwards and de Rugy (2002) at 83. 
55 See Edwards and de Rugy (2002) at 83.  
56 Id. at Table 10-2. Territorial regimes seek to tax all taxpayers including resident taxpayers only on 
domestic (e.g., French) source income.  Thus, all taxpayers whether reside in France or abroad, only pay 
tax on French source income. Id. 
57 Edwards and de Rugy (2002) at 83.  
58 For example, in the United States, a U.S. resident that earns foreign source active income directly is 
subject to U.S. tax. Nevertheless, if the U.S. resident owns 100% of the shares of a foreign corporation 
(which under U.S. law is not a U.S. resident), fundamentally, even though the U.S. resident controls the 
shares of the foreign corporation, the corporation is treated as a separate legal entity from the shareholder. 
Thus, income earned by the corporation is not subject to U.S. tax because it is foreign-source income of a 
non-resident. The shareholder, therefore, can shift the income to the corporation.  If the corporation were 
14
Source-based taxation has been generally justified on the grounds that the source country 
provides the taxpayer (resident or non-resident) with benefits that allow such taxpayer to 
generate the income.59 Source-based taxation is also consistent with the concept of capital 
import neutrality (CIN).60 Residency-based taxation, on the other hand, has been 
generally justified on the grounds that it is consistent with the ability-to-pay principle 
(equity) and that it promotes efficiency in the form of capital export neutrality (CEN).61 
It is generally accepted that CEN is the better guide for cross-border investment (both 
direct and portfolio investment).62 
incorporated in a “tax haven,” the result would be no current taxation of the foreign source income of the 
corporation, which is equivalent to a tax exemption for the interest on these earnings for the period of 
deferral.  This would amount to virtually complete exemption in present value terms if the deferral lasts 
long enough. U.S. tax will be imposed only on one of two events: (i) either when the foreign corporation 
actually pays the dividends to the U.S. resident - then there is tax because this is income of the U.S. 
resident; and (ii) alternatively, the U.S. resident can sell the shares, and that would be a capital gain subject 
to tax too, although at a reduced rate of tax under U.S. rules. Those two events certainly would trigger the 
tax, but both of these events also are completely under the control of the U.S. resident.  The U.S. Code 
contains a complex set of overlapping anti-deferral regimes, all of which result either in current taxation of 
the foreign source income to controlling US shareholders or in an interest charge on the income when it is 
repatriated to the U.S.  
59 Michael J. Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture: Taxing International Income: Inadequate 
Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 Tax L. Rev. 261, 298 (2001) (Hereinafter 
“Graetz (2001)”) (“The idea that the source country has a fair claim to the income produced within its 
borders is also grounded in the view that foreigners, whose activities reach some minimum threshold, 
should contribute to the costs of services provided by the host government, including, for example, the 
costs of roads and other infrastructure, police and fire protection, the system for enforcement of laws, 
education, and the like. The services a nation provides may contribute substantially to the ability of both 
residents and foreigners to earn income there.”); Colon (1999) at 781 (“Source basis taxation is explicitly 
tied to a benefit and burden rationale of taxation; the source country has provided either services or 
protection that have enabled the income to be earned and therefore has the primary right to tax such 
income.”).  
60 See, generally Frisch (1990) at 587-91.  
61 See Merrill et.al. at 1389 (“'Efficiency' refers to the allocation of capital to its most productive uses, i.e., 
those that result in the highest pre-tax rate of return. In an international context, efficiency requires that the 
effective tax rate on investment abroad by a U.S. company be equal to the effective tax rate on domestic 
investment, a principle referred to as capital export neutrality (CEN).”).  
62 See Avi Yonah (2000) at 1610.  
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In general, “[t]he United States exercises income tax jurisdiction on both a source and a 
residence basis.63 Pursuant to Section 61: “Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, 
gross income means all income from whatever source derived…” Section 2(d), however, 
mandates that “[i]n the case of a nonresident alien individual, the taxes imposed by 
sections 1 and 55 shall apply only as provided by section 871 or 877.” 64 The United 
States Internal Revenue Code, therefore, limits the tax liability of non-resident 
individuals (section 2(d)) and foreign corporations (section 11 (d)), to U.S. source income 
by reference to sections 871 or 877 (individuals) and 882 (corporations).65 Thus, while 
U.S. residents are taxed on their worldwide income, for non-resident aliens, the tax is 
limited to US source income.66 
C. Active v. Passive Income
Consistent with the “international tax regime,” in the vast majority of countries including 
the United States, passive income and active income are subject to different treatment.67 
63 May (1995) (“Source-based jurisdiction applies to the fixed or determinable periodic amounts realized 
from U.S. sources by nonresident foreign persons. Residence-based jurisdiction extends to U.S. citizens 
and residents, domestic corporations, and foreign persons doing business in the United States.”). For an 
excellent overview of the U.S. international tax regime, see JCT Reports on International Taxation (JCX-
40-99), 1999 TNT 124-8 (Hereinafter “JCX 40-99”). 
64 Non-residents are generally taxed on all income that is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade 
or business in the United States. See section 864(c)(4).  
65 A foreign person is engaged in a U.S. trade or business if her activities (or the activities of an agent 
acting on her behalf) are considerable, continuous, and regular. See Pinchot v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 
718, 719 (2d Cir. 1940). Foreign persons engaged in a U.S. trade or business are taxed at graduated rates on 
income effectively connected with such trade or business. See section 864(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.864-3-7. In 
computing effectively connected income, foreign persons are allowed to deduct allocable expenses. See 
sections 873 and 882(c).     
66 For the definition of “non-resident alien,” see section 7701(b)(1)(B) (defining who is a nonresident alien 
individual) and Section 7701(a)(5) (defining what is a foreign corporation and partnership). 
67 See Reich (1998) (“Broadly speaking, income can be divided into two categories: active and passive. 
Active income corresponds to earned income from the conduct of business activities, including receipts of a 
business enterprise and wages of an individual. Passive income is investment income, such as interest, 
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This distinction is contained not only in domestic laws but also in all three treaty 
models.68 In most cases, determining what types of income constitute “passive” income 
and what types of income constitute “active” income is easy; the test is whether the 
activity that gives rise to the income is such that a taxpayer controls it.69 In the case of 
passive income, the taxpayer generally has no or little direct control over the production 
of income.70 Common examples of passive income include income from dividends, 
interest (including OID), rent and royalties.71 In the case of active income, generally, the 
taxpayer has direct control over the production of income. Examples of active income 
include income from services and business income.72 
In accordance with the “international tax regime”, the fundamental principle in most 
countries,  as reflected not only in domestic laws but also in numerous tax treaties, is that 
active income is taxed primarily at the source (where the activity took place), while 
passive income should be taxed at the residency country, where it reflects a return on 
capital.73 This concept was introduced by the League of Nations Report (1923).74 In 
general, the League of Nations Report (1923) established that the source country should 
have the first right to tax (the “first bite” principle).75 
dividends, and gains from the sale of stocks and security that is not earned by the taxpayer in the ordinary 
course of business (for example, as a securities dealer or a bank)”).  
68 Avi Yonah (1996) at 1306-07. 
69 Id. at 1309-10.  
70 This is generally referred to as “portfolio” income. Id.   
71 Id. See also Reich (1998).   
72 Id.   
73 See generally Avi Yonah (1996); Reich (1998).  
74 See Avi Yonah (1996) at 1305-06, citing the League of Nations Report (1923) at 18.  
75 In the absence of a treaty, it is the obligation of the residency country to alleviate double taxation by 
either (i) exemption of the foreign source income, or (ii) foreign tax credit. See League of Nations Report 
(1923) at 40.  
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The United States generally follows the active/passive distinction; passive income 
(generally referred to as “FDAP” income - fixed, determinable, annual or periodic) is 
subject to a gross based withholding tax and no deductions are allowed. 76 Pursuant to 
sections 1441 and 1442, U.S. withholding tax applies to a payment if: (i) the payment 
constitutes a fixed or determinable annual or periodical amount (FDAP); (ii) the payment 
has a United States source; and (iii) the payment is not effectively connected to a United 
States trade or business.77 If all three requirements are satisfied, a withholding tax of 30 
percent applies, unless the rate is reduced by an applicable income tax treaty.78 
Congress and Treasury can exempt non-resident taxpayers from withholding tax by either 
(i) exempting a certain type of income from the FDAP definition,79 or (ii) setting forth 
that a certain type of income is not U.S. source income.80 Further, Congress and Treasury 
may provide that certain activities will not give rise to a trade or business in the United 
States.81 
On the other hand, in the United States and also consistent with the “international tax 
regime,” active income (i.e., income effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business) 
 
76 See section 871(a) pursuant to which income of non-residents not connected with a US trade or business, 
other than capital gains, is subject to a 30 percent gross tax. In contrast, under section 871(b), income of 
non-residents which is connected with a U.S. trade or business is subject to graduate rate of tax (i.e., net 
tax), similar to the rates that apply to residents.   
77 Reg. § 1.1441-2(a).  
78 Section 871(a).  
79 See Reg. 1.1441-2(b)(2)(i), exempting from the FDAP income definition gains derived from the sale or 
property, including market discount and option premiums). See also section 871(h) (portfolio interest 
exemption) and sections 871(i)(2)(A) and (B), pursuant to which there is no withholding tax on U.S. source 
interest paid by U.S. banks and on dividends paid by U.S. corporations with significant foreign business 
activities.  
80 For example, pursuant to sections 861(a)(1)(A) and (B), interest paid by a U.S. taxpayer with significant 
foreign business activities to a foreign person is foreign rather than U.S. source income, contrary to the 
general source rules pertaining to interest.   
81 See the discussion below pertaining to the securities trading safe harbor under sections 864(b)(2). 
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is taxed as if it were income of a U.S. resident--that is, it is taxed at the graduated rate 
that applies to residents.82 
Tax treaties generally follow the same approach; rather than giving the source country the 
first bite and allowing credit or exemption in the residency country, treaties simply 
provide for primary jurisdiction to tax active income to the source country, and primary 
jurisdiction to tax passive income to the residency country.83 
In particular, tax treaties reflect the active or passive distinction in two ways: (i) define 
what constitutes an active business operation in a given country (a "permanent 
establishment")84 and give the source country the primary right to tax the income that is 
attributable to that operation; and (ii) seek to reduce as much as possible the taxes levied 
by the source country on passive income (such as income from dividends, interest, and 
royalties) derived from within it, leaving the right to tax that income to the residence 
country.85 
82 Sections 871(b) (Individuals) and 882 (a) (Corporations).   
83 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Dev., Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 1 Tax 
Treaties (CCH) P 191 (Sept. 1, 1992) (Hereinafter “OECD Model Treaty”), Articles 7, 10, 11 (providing 
that passive income be taxed by the residency country while active income may be taxed in the source 
country); United Nations Dep't of Int'l Economic & Social Affairs, United Nations Model Double Taxation 
Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102, U.N. Sales No. 
E.80.XVI.3 (1980) (Hereinafter “U.N. Model Treaty”), Articles 7, 10, 11 (generally following in general 
the OECD Model Treaty, but advocating more source-based taxation of passive income); Internal Revenue 
Service, U.S. Treasury Dep't Convention Between the United States of America and for the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, 1 Tax 
Treaties (1996) (Hereinafter “U.S. Model Treaty”),  Articles  7, 10 and 11 (applying the same principles).  
84 OECD Model Treaty, Articles 5 and 7; U.N. Model Treaty, Articles 5, 7; U.S. Model Treaty, articles 5, 7  
(All defining "permanent establishment").  The U.N. Model Treaty attempts to lower the threshold of the 
permanent establishment standard, thereby allowing developing countries more source-based taxation.    
85 See OECD Model Treaty, Articles 10(2)(b) (dividends), 11(2) (interest) and 12(1) (royalties); U.N. 
Model Treaty, Articles 10-12; U.S. Model Treaty, Articles 10-12.  
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According to Professor Avi Yonah (1996), the tax treaties do not completely achieve 
their goal of dividing the worldwide taxing jurisdiction between source and residence 
countries.86 First, the permanent establishment concept reflects a compromise: not all 
active business income is taxable primarily in the source country but rather only income 
that is attributable to a permanent establishment.87 Second, the taxation of passive income 
at its source is not completely abolished, but it is reduced in most treaties to the lowest 
possible levels (0%-15%).  
 
D. The Rationale Behind the Active/Passive Distinction
In general, the different treatment of active and passive income in domestic laws and tax 
treaties has been justified on several grounds.  First, the taxation of active business 
income represents the taxation of the profits of the firm while the taxation of passive 
income represents the taxation of the division of those profits.88 
Second, the generation of active income is generally under the taxpayer’s control while 
the generation of passive income is generally in the form of “portfolio” income.89 For this 
purpose, “portfolio” income does not include income derived by controlling shareholders, 
 
86 Avi Yonah (1996) at 1307-08.  
87 Some treaties, especially under the U.N. Model treaty, contain a “force of attraction” rule, as discussed 
below.  
88 Michael Graetz and Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 Tax L. Rev. 537, 547 
(2003) (Hereinafter “Graetz and Grinberg (2003)”). (“It may be simpler analytically, however, to regard 
income from [foreign direct income] as representing the profits from conducting business activities abroad 
- the profits of the firm - and income from [foreign portfolio income] as representing passive investment 
income - the profits realized by investors in the firm.”), citing Avi Yonah (1996) at 1308-10.  The problem 
is where there might be multiple sources of income (for example, interest): both where the capital is used 
and where the capital was accumulated.  Avi Yonah (1996) at 1309. 
89 Avi Yonah (1996) at 1309. See also Background and Issues Relating to the Taxation of Foreign 
Investment In The United States (JCS 1-90) (“The portfolio investor generally does not have control over 
the assets that underlie the financial claims.”).  
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since in such a case, even passive income (e.g., dividends) would be under the control of 
the recipient.90 
Finally, another justification for the distinction between active and passive income relates 
to who earns the income; while active income is earned basically by large, publicly 
traded corporations, passive income is earned by individuals or small corporations.91 
E. Residency-based Taxation?
While this article focuses residency-based taxation for financial transactions, some of the 
arguments for more general residency-based taxation may also support this article’s 
conclusions.92 Many commentators over the years have advocated the adoption of pure 
residency-based taxation.93 As set forth above, one of the major arguments in support for 
such a regime is that residency-based taxation promotes equity since the ability-to-pay 
principle is violated in a source-based taxation regime.94 Furthermore, a pure residency-
based regime is more efficient because it is compatible with the goal of capital export 
neutrality (CEN), which requires that the decision to invest in a given location not be 
affected by tax rates.95 
90 Id.  
91 Graetz and Grinberg (2003), at 547 (“Foreign portfolio income often is earned today by both individuals 
and corporations, while FDI virtually always is made by corporations.”).  
92 See generally, Graetz and O’Hear (1997) at 1033-41 (Describing the history of the United States’ 
international tax policy and the support for the residency-based regime).  
93 Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79 
Cornell L. Rev. 18, 29 (1993). 
94 Id.  
95 Graetz (2001) at 270 (“Achieving [worldwide] efficiency typically is said to involve two kinds of 
neutralities. The first is capital export neutrality (CEN), which is neutral about a resident's choice between 
domestic and foreign investments providing the same pretax rates of return. CEN requires that a resident of 
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Thus, elimination of withholding taxes by the source country promotes optimal allocation 
of capital investment across countries:    
 
Assuming that withholding taxes at source under bilateral agreements 
generally are modest (or nil) and creditable against the tax liability in the 
residence country, the taxes at home will determine the overall tax level 
on the saver, independent of the source of the income. In this situation, 
interest arbitrage will tend to equalize pretax rates of return 
internationally. As the gross return to capital in equilibrium is equal to the 
marginal product of capital, it follows that a universal use of the residence 
principle will result in equalized marginal products of capital across 
countries, and thus entail an optimal international allocation of investment, 
maximizing future world output.96 
Residence-based taxation is also simpler because countries will not need to establish 
source rules; residents will be taxed on their worldwide income regardless of where the 
source is.  Finally, if each country taxes only its own residents and all countries agree on 
the definition of a “resident” there should be no dual residency problems. 
 
any nation pays the same marginal rate of income taxation regardless of the nation in which she invests. 
CEN is not only neutral about where such investments are made but also is indifferent about which country 
collects the tax revenue when capital originating in one country produces income in another. Typically, 
economists regard CEN as essential for worldwide economic efficiency, because the location of 
investments would be unaffected by capital income taxes.”).  
96 Norregaard, John Tax Treatment Of Government Bonds, 15 Tax Notes Int'l 143, citing Razin, Assaf, 
Efraim Sadka, and Chi-Wa Yuen, 1996, 'A Pecking Order Theory of Capital Inflows and International Tax 
Principles,' IMF Working Paper 96/26 (Washington: International Monetary Fund), Tax Notes Int'l, Jan. 1, 
1996, p. 47.  
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F. Determining the Source of Income
Unless all countries move to a pure residency-based taxation, source rules would be 
required to determine which country has the first jurisdiction to tax an item of income.97 
In the vast majority of countries, however, most types of income and deductions do not 
have a defined source, and the source is therefore determined on a case-by-case basis. 
With respect to complicated items of income or deductions defining the source is very 
difficult and it is hard to pinpoint the correct economic source.98 
In many countries including the U.S., source rules can be divided in two categories: (i) 
formal rules, and (ii) economic rules.  Formal rules do not attempt to trace the economic 
source of the income but seek to achieve administrative ease and certainty. Economic 
rules, on the other hand, do attempt to trace the economic source of the income, but result 
in more litigation and uncertainty.  
 
The main difference between the formal and economic rules is that the formal rules are 
relatively easy to administer from both the taxpayers’ and the tax authorities’ 
perspectives because they are bright line rules and simply require one single 
determination such as residence of the payor, residence of the seller or passage of title, to 
 
97 See May (1995) (“Source rules play a critical role in defining the scope of U.S. tax jurisdiction. They 
identify the U.S.-source income over which the United States asserts primary jurisdiction. They also 
determine the extent to which, through the foreign tax credit system, the United States will curtail its 
residence-based claims and effectively yield tax jurisdiction to a source country.”). 
98 See JCX-40-99 (“The source of income for U.S. tax purposes is determined based on various factors. The 
relevant factors include the location or nationality of the payor, the location or nationality of the recipient, 
the location of the recipient's activities that generate the income, and the location of the assets that generate 
the income.”).  
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establish the source.   The economic rules, on the other hand, involve much more difficult 
determination such as where a patent or copyright was actually used, which is sometimes 
not easy to determine, especially if it is used in many countries.  Economic source rules 
are therefore tougher to avoid by the taxpayer because as opposed to formal rules, they 
are not significantly under the taxpayer’s control.  
 
G. The Role of Tax Treaties in Allocating Income Between the Source and 
Residency Country
According to Professor Hugh Ault, “From the beginning, treaties have involved the 
allocation of taxing claims and the international division of revenue.”99 As set forth 
above, in the absence of a treaty between the source country and residency country, the 
source country has the right to tax all income (passive and active) derived therein.100 To 
serve its most important role of preventing double taxation, tax treaties generally shift tax 
revenue from the source country to the residence country by forcing a rule pursuant to 
which active income is taxed on source but only if it is attributable to “permanent 
establishment,” while passive income (e.g., interest and dividend) is barely taxed at 
source at all.101 This division was also established by the League of Nations in 1928, in 
its first model treaty, as described in more detail below. 102 
99 See Ault (1992) at 567. 
100 See League of Nations Report (1923).  
101 See Colon (1999) at  786 (“treaty signatories usually agree to eliminate or substantially reduce source 
basis taxation on income earned by residents of the other country, for instance, dividends, rents, royalties, 
and interest.”). 
102 See Report Presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on Double Taxation and Tax 
Evasion, League of Nations, Doc. C.562.M.178. 1928 II (Oct. 31, 1928) (Hereinafter “League of Nations 
Report (1928)”).     
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Generally, in all existing treaties, passive income is mostly taxed by the residency 
country (rates at source are between 0%-15%), while active income is taxed by the source 
country.103 
Source-based taxation of active income is limited under all three models to income that is 
“attributable” to a “permanent establishment” at the source country.104 In both the United 
States and OECD models, there is no “force of attraction” rule; therefore, only income 
that is attributable to a permanent establishment is taxed by the source country, while 
income that is not attributable to such permanent establishment will be subject to the rates 
set forth in the treaty for other types of income.105 As a result, whether the source country 
can tax a certain item of income would depend on how high the permanent establishment 
threshold is set. In general, the permanent establishment threshold for physical presence 
is higher than the U.S. trade and business requirement; thus, a treaty allows non-U.S. 
residents to conduct more business in the U.S. without being subject to tax in the U.S. 
(but may be subject to state taxes, because the treaty only covers federal taxes).  
 
In 1928, the League of Nations issued a model for bilateral income tax treaty for the 
reciprocal relief of double taxation of international income, which still serves as the basis 
 
103 Id. See also JCX 40-99.  
104 See JCX-40-99 (“Under the U.S. model, one treaty country may not tax the business profits of an 
enterprise of a qualified resident of the other treaty country, unless the enterprise carries on business in the 
first country through a permanent establishment situated there. In that case, the business profits of the 
enterprise may be taxed in the first country on profits that are attributable to that permanent 
establishment.”)   
105 Id.  Note that “The U.N. model adds a limited ‘force of attraction rule’ which would allow the country in 
which the permanent establishment is located to attribute to the permanent establishment sales in that 
country of goods or merchandise of the same or similar kind as those sold through the permanent 
establishment, and to attribute to the permanent establishment other business activities carried on in that 
country of the same or similar kind as those effected through the permanent establishment.” Id.  
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for the model income tax treaties of the following models: (i) U.N. Model Treaty; (ii) 
OECD Model Treaty; and (iii) U.S. Model Treaty (for treaties to which the United States 
is a party).106 Obviously, the U.N. Model Treaty is the most favorable to source countries, 
because it is designed for developing countries; the U.N. Model Treaty normally allows 
more source-based taxation than the U.S./OECD models.107 The U.S. Model Treaty, on 
the other hand, is the least favorable to source countries, because it is designed for the US 
(a capital exporter).  
 
The motivation of a developing country to enter into a treaty with a developed country is 
obvious; assuming that the latter is a capital exporter and the former is a capital importer 
country, a tax treaty creates stability. Many developing countries do not have stable 
regimes. A tax treaty protects foreign investors from sudden increases in the tax rates. 
Stability is often more important for US investors than the actual rates. Further, a tax 
treaty would provide foreign investors with information about current taxes. Finally, a tax 
treaty would bring the developing country closer to the community of developed 
countries. 
 
106 Graetz and O’Hear (1997) at 1023.  See also JCX 40-99 (“The preferred tax treaty policies of the United 
States have been expressed from time to time in model treaties and agreements. The Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (the ‘OECD’) also has published model tax treaties. In addition, 
the United Nations has published a model treaty for use between developed and developing countries. The 
Treasury Department, which together with the State Department is responsible for negotiating tax treaties, 
last published a proposed model income tax treaty in September 1996 (the ‘U.S. model’). The OECD last 
published a model income tax treaty in 1992 (‘the OECD model’). The United Nations last published a 
model income tax treaty in 1980 (‘the U.N. model’).”). 
107 For example, the U.N. Model treaty increases the scope of permanent establishment to include more 
activities, such reducing the length of construction work that is viewed as a permanent establishment from 
12 to 6 months 
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III. Taxation of Cross-border Financial Transactions 
A. General
Income and deduction items from financial transactions generally include: (1) Interest 
and dividend income/deduction on debt and equity instruments (ordinary income); (2) 
ordinary income/deductions from other types of financial instruments (e.g., notional 
principal contracts); and (3) Capital gains/losses.  
 
For each of the above items, there are three different tax related issues: (1) The character 
of the income (ordinary v. character), (2) The time when the income or deduction is 
recognized, and (3) Whether the income has domestic or foreign source (and whether it is 
taxed by the source country or not). 108 Numerous articles have been written on the issues 
of timing and character of income and deductions from financial transactions.  This 
article focuses only on the third issue.   
 
As of today, only a few countries have enacted a comprehensive set of rules pertaining to 
taxation of financial instruments.109 As Victor Thuronyi indicates, however, not all 
countries need a comprehensive set of tax rules for financial instruments - “Countries that 
(i) do not have reduced rates (or exemption) for capital gains, (ii) base their corporate 
income tax on the financial accounting rules, and (iii) have kept their corporate income 
tax rules simple therefore may not need extensive special rules for [financial instruments] 
 
108 See Thuronyi (2001) at 261.  
109 Id. These include the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.  
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in their domestic legislation.”110 Nevertheless, the increasing use of financial instruments 
in many countries, developed and developing, requires a new assessment of the need to at 
least establish basic principles for cross-border aspects.111 Many countries have been 
updating their income tax systems to address the taxation of financial transactions.112 
As opposed to taxation of cross border direct investment, the tax literature on taxation of 
portfolio investment is relatively thin.113 Nevertheless, cross –border portfolio 
investment has been booming in recent years, and it can no longer be ignored.114 
A fundamental distinction in the context of cross-border investment is between direct 
investment and portfolio investment.115 “Portfolio investment” generally means 
“investments in stocks and debt and other securities of U.S. issuers (and derivatives 
relating thereto) by non-U.S. persons that do not directly, indirectly, or constructively 
own a substantial equity interest in the U.S. issuer, where such investments are not 
effectively connected with a U.S. trade or business of such non-U.S. persons.. . . the 
dividing line between portfolio investments and related-party investments varies, and 
may for example be 5 percent, 10 percent, or 50 percent, depending on the particular 
 
110 Thuronyi (2001) at 264. 
111 See e.g., the United Kingdom Finance Act of 2002 and the 2002 reform in the Israeli tax system, both 
discussed below.  
112 Id. See also recent tax reforms in Mexico.  
113 Graetz and Grinberg (2003) at 538.  
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
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statutory or regulatory provision.”116 Direct investment is generally any type of 
investment other than “portfolio investment.”  
 
Many countries (developed and developing) face a serious conflict between imposing 
higher rates on income sourced therein to generate revenue and providing tax relief to 
attract foreign investors.117 In the case of financial transactions, the conflict becomes 
even harder, since money is fungible, and foreign investors can easily switch their 
investments from one country to another in response to tax burden.118 
In 1991, the OECD praised the benefits of globalization : 
 
Capital markets in OECD countries are increasingly integrated as member 
countries have removed controls on international investment and foreign 
exchange regulations. At the same time, the proportion of international 
activities accounted for by large multinational enterprises (MNEs) has 
increased. One consequence of this gradual liberalization and 
globalization is that international capital flows may have become more 
sensitive to differences in the tax regimes between countries.119 
116 See Reich (1998). See also JCX 40-99.  
117 See Leif Muten International Experience of How Taxes Influence the Movement of Private Capital, 8 
Tax Notes Int'l 743, 744 (1994).   
118 Graetz and Grinberg (2003) at 549 (“In contrast [to direct investment], portfolio investment dollars are 
volatile and move rapidly throughout the world seeking the highest return possible for a given level of risk. 
[footnote omitted] In portfolios managed by investment professionals, investments in one foreign country 
are frequently interchangeable with investments in countries with similar risk/return profiles. [footnote 
omitted] One consequence is that portfolio investment dollars abroad may substitute for investments at 
home.” 
119 Norregaard, John and Owens, Jeffrey, Taxing Profits in a Global Economy, 4 Tax Notes Int'l 491 
(summarizing 'Taxing Profits in a Global Economy: Domestic and International Issues' (OECD 1992)). 
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Nevertheless, seven years later, the OECD Report (1998) on harmful tax competition also 
stated that “the process of globalisation has led to increased competition among 
businesses in the global market place.”120 Thus, the conflict that many countries face 
today is between reducing the tax burden of financial transactions to attract foreign 
investors and not being criticized at engaging in harmful tax competition.121 My 
suggestion to Country D is to generally follow the footsteps of the United States in 
taxation of certain cross-border financial transactions. This way, it can successfully 
attract foreign investment, but will not be viewed as engaging in harmful tax competition.      
 
B. Taxation of Interest, Dividends and Capital Gains
1. Taxation of Cross-border Interest and Dividends  
 
In the United States as well as many other countries, the source of income from dividend 
and interest is the residency of the payor.122 The rationale behind this formal rule is that it 
is administratively hard to tax interest from a foreign corporation to foreign holders, but 
easier to tax interest from a U.S. payor (using withholding).   In contrast, as described in 
greater detail below, the source of income from a notional principal contract is the 
 
120 OECD Report (1998) para 22.  
121 See generally Avi Yonah (2000). 
122 Section 861(a)(1) (Interest) and 861(a)(2) (Dividends).  See also JCX 40-99.  
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recipient’s residency.123 Other countries, such as Mexico for example, attempt to trace the 
economic source of interest income.124 
Tax rates applicable to interest and dividend differ between countries; in some countries 
such income is taxed on the basis of the taxpayer’s marginal rate while in others the 
ordinary rates applicable to interest and/or dividend are fixed.125 Several countries have 
also adopted a regime pursuant to which the rate of tax applicable to capital gains is 
lower then the maximum ordinary rates.126 
In the U.S., there are two possible tax regimes that could apply to non-U.S. residents 
deriving interest and dividends income in the U.S.: (i) non-U.S. persons that are engaged 
in a "trade or business" in the United States are subject to U.S. tax at the usual rates for 
individuals or corporations, as the case may be, on income that is "effectively connected" 
with such U.S. trade or business,127 and (ii) non-U.S. persons that are not so engaged, or 
 
123 Reg. 1.863-7.  
124 See Guerrero, Juan Carlos, Mexico Publishes New Rules On Public Debt Instruments, 38 Tax Notes Int'l 
472 (April 28, 2005) (“Article 195 of the Income Tax Law establishes that for interest income, the source is 
considered to be located in Mexico if capital is placed or invested in Mexico, or if the interest is paid by a 
resident of Mexico or by a nonresident with a PE in Mexico. For that reason, if a Mexican resident pays 
interest to a nonresident, it will be considered Mexican-source income, and the nonresident will be required 
to pay income tax in Mexico on the interest payment.”). Cf. Israel, where in 2003, newly added section 4A 
to the Income Tax Ordinance adopted source rules that are similar in many aspects to those in U.S. tax laws 
as well as under most treaties. In particular, the bill provides that the source of interest income is the place 
of residency of the debtor. See Keinan, Yoram and Katalan, Shlomo Israel's Income Tax Reform: Roads 
Not Taken, 28 Tax Notes Int'l 941 (Sept. 24, 2002). 
125 See Edwards and de Rugy (2002) at 79 (“Tax competition has spurred other tax reforms. A group of 
Nordic countries has installed dual income tax systems that feature a low flat rate on capital income 
(interest, dividends, and capital gains) but retain progressive rates on labor income. Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden implemented such reforms a decade ago. The Netherlands and Austria have recently 
enacted similar reforms, and other European countries have moved in that direction.”). 
126 See Keinan and Menuchin (2003).  
127 Section 864(c). As discussed above, in the case of a treaty, the standard would be income that is 
“attributable” to a “permanent establishment” in the United States.   
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that derive interest or dividend income that is not effectively connected, are subject to 
withholding tax of 30 percent (unless reduced by a treaty or applicable domestic rule).128 
2. Taxation of Interest  
 
Congress has generally exempted interest income (but not dividend income) derived in 
the United States by non-residents in two ways: (i) treating the income as non-U.S source 
income, or (ii) exempting such income from U.S. tax even if it is treated as U.S. source 
income.129 Examples of the former are sections 861(a)(1)(A) and (B), pursuant to which 
interest paid by a U.S. taxpayer with significant foreign business activities to a foreign 
person is foreign rather than U.S. source income, contrary to the general source rules 
pertaining to interest.130 
The most notable example of the latter is, of course, the “portfolio interest exemption,” 
which is the most significant exemption from gross tax on FDAP income in the United 
States.131 Since 1984, interest paid to a nonresident who does not control 10% or more of 
the payor is generally exempt.132 Thus, interest on a loan from a foreign parent to a U.S. 
subsidiary is not exempt if the parent owns 10 percent or more of the US subsidiary’s 
stock.  Congress specifically indicated that the portfolio interest exemption was enacted 
"to allow U.S. corporations (and the U.S. Treasury) direct access to the Eurobond 
 
128 Section 871(a)(1)(A) (Individuals); Section 881(b)(1)(A) (Corporations).  
129 See Colon (1999) at 783, note 25.  
130 Id. Another example discussed below is the source rules for income on a notional principal contract 
pursuant to Treas. Reg. 1.863-7 (residency of recipient). See also JCX 40-99.    
131 Id.  
132 Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494. See also Avi Yonah (2000) at 1579-80.  
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market."133 As two commentators indicate “The portfolio-interest exception is perhaps 
the purest example of enlightened self-interest and realism in attracting foreign 
capital.”134 
In general, under the portfolio interest exemption, interest earned by non-residents is 
exempt from withholding tax unless it is paid to: (i) a "10-percent shareholder" or other 
related person;135 (ii) a bank on an extension of credit made pursuant to a loan agreement 
entered into in the ordinary course of its trade or business;136 or (iii) a controlled foreign 
corporation from a related person.137 
With respect to tax treaties, the United States clearly follows the same principle – 
pursuant to the U.S. Model Treaty, the rate of withholding for interest under Article 11 
should be zero.138 The OECD Model Treaty permits up to 10 percent of withholding rate 
for interest,139 and as illustrated in Table 2 below, it is very rare for interest income to be 
taxable at more than 10 percent by the source country.  Finally, the U.N. Model Treaty 
 
133 Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., General Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, p. 392 (the stated purpose of the exemption was “to allow U.S. corporations 
(and the U.S. Treasury) direct access to the Eurobond market."). See also the 1984 Joint Committee on 
Taxation (JCT) report accompanying the legislation (Tax Treatment of Interest Paid to Foreign Investors 
(JCS-23-84, April 28, 1984).  ("if the primary effect of repeal is to cause foreign investors to shift from 
short to medium term U.S. securities . . . , then medium term interest rates would decline. . . . [T]his would 
benefit the US economy by stimulating investment in plant and equipment. . . . proponents of repeal of the . 
. . withholding tax argue that the attractiveness of U.S. bonds in the international bond market is greatly 
diminished by the withholding tax, so that the tax is a barrier to international trade in assets.").  
134 Dan R. Mastromarco and Lawrence A. Hunter, The U.S. Anti-Savings Directive, 2002 TNT 247-28. 
135 Section 871(h)(3). 
136 Section 881(c)(3)(A). 
137 Section 881(c)(3)(C). 
138 See JCX 40-99. This rate is however, negotiable, (e.g., with Mexico the rate for interest is 4.9%; with 
Japan the rate for royalty is 10%). 
139 Id.  
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suggests higher rates for passive income in general, and for interest in particular, but 
leaves more tax revenues in the source country, but it is on a case-by-case basis.140 
3. Taxation of Dividends and Total Return Swaps 
 
As set forth above, the source of dividend income is generally the residency of the payor 
in many countries including the United States.141 To date, there is no parallel portfolio 
dividend exemption in the United States; 142 dividend income is generally subject to a 30 
percent withholding tax, unless a treaty applies to reduce the rate.143 In many treaties, the 
rate for dividend is split; source country taxes at a 5% rate for dividends to shareholders 
who own a high percentage of the shares and 15% for portfolio dividends.144 
U.S. withholding tax on inbound transactions by foreign investors may be avoided by 
using various types of derivatives, because the source of income from derivatives is 
generally the residency of holder.145 For example, withholding on dividends can be 
 
140 Id.  
141 Section 861(a)(2)(A).  
142 See Yaron Reich (1998); Merrill et. al. at 1389 (“The recent proliferation of free trade areas bolsters the 
argument for zero withholding on direct dividends. The full benefits of an integrated regional market 
require elimination of barriers to capital flows -- including withholding taxes -- as well as trade flows.”).  
143 See JCX 40-99. See, e.g. OECD Model Treaty, Article 10.2 (the source country has the right to tax 
dividend income distributed by a corporation resident in the source country. The rate of tax is limited to 
15% in the case of portfolio dividends and 5% in the case of dividends paid to direct corporate investors).  
144 Id. See also U.S. Model Treaty, Article 10.  Nevertheless, the shareholding threshold differs between the 
two models – while in the U.S. Model Treaty, the reduced rate would apply for 10 percent or more holding, 
the OECD Model Treaty requires at least 25 percent of shareholding to be eligible for the reduced rate. 
145 See, Thuronyi (2001) (describing various abusive situations); Reich (1998), citing the preamble to prop. 
Treas. reg. section 1.864(b)-1, issued June 11, 1998; Preamble to Regulations Issued under Section 446(b), 
T.D. 849, 58 Fed. Reg. 53125 (Oct. 14, 1993) ("[T]he IRS is considering whether notional principal 
contracts involving certain specified indices (e.g., one issuer's stock) should be excluded from the general 
sourcing rules of Section 861 through 865..."); Preamble to Proposed Regulations Regarding Certain 
Payments Made Pursuant to a Securities Lending Transaction, 1992-1 CB 1196 ("The Service is 
considering whether the proposed regulations should apply to dividend equivalent payments made in 
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avoided by using a total return equity swap; instead of buying the shares directly, the 
foreign investor enters into a swap with a U.S. investment bank and pays the value of the 
shares to the bank.146 In return, the investment bank will pay to the foreign investor an 
amount equal to the dividend paid by the U.S. corporation (“the dividend equivalent 
amount”).  There is no U.S. withholding tax on the payment of the dividend equivalent 
amount from the U.S. bank to the foreign investor, because the source rule of derivatives 
is the residence of the recipient. On the other hand, the dividends paid to the US bank are 
taxable to the US investment bank, but the bank may deduct the payment of the dividend 
equivalent amount as an expense, and thus the net income is 0.  At the end of the 
contract, the bank will return the initial investment adjusted for changes in the price of 
the shares of the US corporation.147 
In my view, there is no reason to distinguish between portfolio interest and dividend – 
both should be exempt if the above conditions for portfolio holding are met.148 According 
to Reich (1998), there are two main reasons for enacting portfolio dividend exemption:  
 
A portfolio dividends exemption would align the U.S. tax treatment of 
dividend income of portfolio investors with the exemption that applies to 
all other portfolio investment income from stocks, securities, and related 
derivatives, thereby further fostering the open capital markets that are a 
 
connection with certain notional principal contracts, such as an equity index swap structured to replicate the 
cash flows that would arise from an installment purchase of one or more equity securities").   
146 Id. See also Avi Yonah (1996). 
147 Id.   
148 See Reich (1998) (elaborating that “the withholding tax on dividends paid to foreign investors may serve 
as a significant barrier to certain types of investments by foreign investors in U.S. equities.”).  
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featured and hallowed goal of U.S. international economic policy. . .A 
portfolio dividends exemption also would resolve the problem of how to 
deal with the disparity in treatment between dividends and returns on 
derivatives-based investments in U.S. stocks.149 
The same arguments could be made in the case of developing countries.  Thus, my 
suggestion to Country D would be to have the same exemption for interest and dividends 
earned by non-resident, as long as it satisfies the portfolio investment standard. Similarly, 
tax treaties should not have different rates for interest and dividend income.150 
4. Capital Gains 
 
In the United States as well as many other countries, the source of capital gains (other 
than from sale of inventory) is the residency of the seller (i.e., formal rule).151 The most 
common exception is for sales of real property - the source of capital gain on sale of real 
estate is the place of the real estate (economic rule).152 Thus, capital gain on the sale of 
shares in a U.S. corporation by a foreign shareholder or sales of other securities 
(including derivatives) is not U.S. source income.153 
149 Id.  
150 See, generally, Merrill et. al. at 1389.  
151 Section 865(a). In the case of inventory, there is a split between formal and economic rules. For 
purchased inventory, the source of income is the place of passage of title. It was designed to be an 
economic rule, but now it is considered a formal rule because “passage of title” is purely a formal element 
the parties may decide on. For produced inventory, there is a formula: 50% place of production and 50% 
place of sale (more economic rule). For intangibles, the source is the place of passage of title. 
152 Sections 861(a)(5) and 862(a)(5).  
153 See Reich (1998) (“Non-ECI capital gains recognized by foreign investors from the sale of U.S. 
portfolio securities (including gains on options, futures, and forward contracts) are generally exempt from 
U.S. income and withholding tax.”). 
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Nevertheless, this treatment creates a potential unwarranted inconsistency between 
capital gains on sale of stock and dividends on the same stock, because the amount of 
gain from a sale of stock is essentially equal to the company’s current accumulated 
earnings plus the present value of its future earnings- both represent earnings that if 
distributed, would give rise to dividend income sourced according to the residence of the 
payor.  Thus, if a U.S. corporation distributes a dividend to its foreign shareholder, the 
income is U.S. source income. Nevertheless, if the corporation never distributes 
dividends and the shareholder sells the shares for a gain, it is foreign source income even 
though the gain represents the same value that would have been received as dividends.  
 
5. The “Race to the Bottom” 
 
The result of the United States’ enactment of the portfolio interest exemption in 1984 has 
been a classic “race to the bottom” because many other countries have followed the 
United States and abolished their withholding tax on interest and dividends for fear of 
losing mobile capital flows to the United States.154 
As further elaborated by Graetz and Grinberg (1997), many countries give up their rights 
to tax interest income derived by non-residents: 
 
154 Avi Yonah (2000). See also Edwards and de Rugy (2002) at 72, citing Sven-Olaf Lodin, "International 
Tax Issues in a Rapidly Changing World," International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation Bulletin, January 
2001, p. 6. The authors indicate that “One survey of 19 major economies found that the withholding tax on 
bank interest has been more than cut in half in the past decade.” Citing from Harry Huizinga and Gaetan 
Nicodeme, "Are International Deposits Tax-Driven?" European Commission Economic Paper No. 152, 
July 2001, p. 31-2.  
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Most corporate tax rates in OECD countries today are in the range from 
25% to 35%. By imposing these corporate income taxes, source countries 
exercise their right to tax international business income. On the other 
hand, source countries today rarely exercise any right to tax interest 
income earned by foreign portfolio lenders and, where bilateral treaties are 
in force, tend to tax portfolio dividend income at a zero to 15% 
withholding rate.155 
Table 1 shows how major developed countries tax income from interest dividends 
derived by non-residents.156 
Table 1
Country Interest (w/h) Dividends (w/h) 
Belgium 15%157 - 25% 0%- 15% – 25% 
Denmark 0%158 - 30% 0%159 - 28% -  
France 16% 25% 
Germany 0%160 - 35%  0% 
Greece 10%  - 29%161 0%
Ireland 20% 20% - 0%162 
Italy 0%163 - 12.5% - 27% 0% - 12.5%164- 27%165 
155 Graetz and Grinberg (1997) at 548-9. See also Norregaard, John Tax Treatment of Government Bonds,
15 Tax Notes Int'l 143 (“The increase in international mobility of capital has led to significant downward 
pressures on these withholding rates, and has led a number of countries to abolish them since the mid-
1980s.”). 
156 These numbers are taken from Ernst & Young’s Corporate Tax Guide (2006).  
157 Belgian source interest is subject to a 15% withholding tax if the underlying agreement was concluded 
on or after 1 March 1990. 
158 When certain conditions are met. 
159 Dividends are exempt from withholding tax if certain conditions are met. 
160 35% withholding on over- the-counter transactions. 
161 This withholding tax applies to interest paid to foreign legal entities that do not have a permanent 
establishment in Greece.  
162 Exemption for non-residents if certain conditions are met. 
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Luxembourg 0% 20% 
Netherlands 0% 25% 
Portugal 15% - 20%  15%166 - 25%167 
Spain 15% 15% 
United Kingdom 20% 0% 
United States 0%168 - 30%  30% 
Japan 15% - 20% 20% 
Australia 10% 0% - 30% 
New Zeeland 15%169 - 19.5%170 30%171 - 33%172 
Canada 25% 25% 
Russia 15%-20% 9% - 15%173 
Brazil 15% 0% 
Mexico 10% - 29% 0% 
Argentina 15.05% - 35% 0% 
Singapore 15% 0% 
Hong Kong 0% 0% 
Philippines 20% - 35% 0% - 15% - 35% 
Norway 0% 25% 
Sweden 0% 30% 
Switzerland 35% 35% 
These low rates of tax on interest and dividend income by the source countries are 
consistent with the vast majority of tax treaties.174 As set forth above, all three tax treaty 
models advocate lower rates for passive income (between 0 to 15 percent), and in many 
 
163 Interest derived by nonresidents on deposit accounts. 
164 Dividends paid to resident individuals with non-substantial participation. 
165 Dividends paid to non-residents. 
166 Paid to residents. 
167 Paid to non-residents.  
168 Portfolio interest is exempt. 
169 Withholding tax for non-residents. 
170 Withholding tax for residents (individuals). 
171 Withholding tax for non-residents. 
172 Withholding tax for residents. 
173 The 15% rate applies if either the payor or the recipient of the dividend is a foreign legal entity 
174 Interest is defined under Article 11 of both the OECD Model Treaty and the U.S. Model Treaty as 
"income from debt-claims of every kind."  
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cases, the rate on interest income is reduced to zero.175 In general, most treaties reduce 
the rates on income from interest and dividends to no more than 15% and therefore, allow 
the residency country to collect most of the tax on such income.176 Furthermore, most 
treaties provide that capital gains tax is collected by the residency country.177 Thus, when 
countries adopt portfolio interest exemption provisions similar to the US, they simply 
conform their internal tax laws to what a treaty would normally mandate for such income.   
 
Table 2 shows how the above countries tax income from interest dividends derived by 
non-residents under treaties.178 
Table 2
Country Interest (w/h) Dividends (w/h) 
Belgium 5% - 25% 10% - 20% 
Denmark 0% 0% - 25% 
France 0% - 20% 0% - 25% 
Germany 0% - 25% 0% - 20% 
Greece 0% - 40%  -  
Ireland 0% - 15% 0% 
Italy 0% - 27% 0% - 27% 
Luxembourg 0% 0% - 20% 
Netherlands 0% 0% - 20% 
Portugal 10% - 15% 10% - 15% 
Spain 0% - 15% 0% - 15% 
United Kingdom 0% - 25% -  
United States 0% - 30% 0% - 30% 
Japan 0% - 20% 0% - 20% 
175 Id. ("interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State may be 
taxed in that other State… However, such interest may also be taxed in the Contracting State in which it 
arises and according to the laws of that State. . . ."). 
176 Id. See OECD Model Treaty (suggests rates of 5% to 15% on dividends, 10% on interest, and 0% on 
royalties; U.S. Model Treaty (suggests rates of 5% to 15% on dividends, and 0% on interest and royalties).    
177 Id. Article 13. 
178 These numbers are taken from Ernst & Young’s Corporate Tax Guide (2006).  
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Australia 10%-12% 15% - 25% 
New Zealand 10% - 15% 15% 
Canada 0% - 25% 0% - 25% 
Russia 0% - 15% 5% - 15% 
Brazil 12.5% - 15% 0% 
Mexico 4.9% - 15% 0% - 15% 
Argentina 0% - 20% 10% - 15% 
Singapore 0% - 15% - 
Hong Kong   
Philippines 10% - 15% 15% - 25% 
Norway  -  0% - 25% 
Sweden  -  0% - 25% 
Switzerland 0% - 15% 0% - 15% 
The enactment of the portfolio interest exemption clearly achieved its goal in the United 
States.179 Developing countries have even more incentive to follow these rules. 180 As two 
commentators indicate: 
 
High tax rates are more difficult to sustain in the new economic 
environment. That is particularly true for taxes on capital, which include 
taxes on business profits and taxes on individual receipts of dividends, 
interest, and capital gains. Basic economic theory suggests that high taxes 
on capital create an increasing drag on growth as capital mobility 
increases. High taxation of capital causes capital flight, thus reducing 
 
179 Dan R. Mastromarco and Lawrence A. Hunter, The U.S. Anti-Savings Directive, 2002 TNT 247-28 
(“For nearly two decades, U.S. law has encouraged foreigners to invest in U.S. banks and debt securities by 
imposing no tax on interest earned on foreign deposits, except in very narrow circumstances. The policy is 
estimated to have attracted approximately $ 1 trillion to the United States. Reversing this policy risks 
driving hundreds of billions of dollars out of the United States.”).  
180 See Avi Yonah (2000) at 1582 (“The standard economic advice to small, open economies is to avoid 
taxing capital income at its source, because the tax will be shifted forward to the borrowers and result in 
higher domestic interest rates.”).  
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domestic productivity, wages, and incomes.181 
Thus, when the source country attempts to impose tax on interest, for example, 
the return for the foreign investor will be reduced by virtue of the withholding tax, 
and this will create a disincentive by the investors to invest in Country D.182 This 
is particularly true for small open economies such as Country D, which generally 
accept world interest rates as a given.183 
Furthermore, as set forth above, residency-based taxation promotes CEN, and with 
respect to passive income, it is even clearer. 184 Taxation of portfolio investment by 
residency countries has been viewed by many commentators as the most efficient regime:  
 
From the point of view of worldwide efficiency, there would seem to be 
no reason for tax rules to distort the decisions of portfolio investors. If a 
 
181 See Edwards and de Rugy (2002) (The authors quote from the 1991 OECD Report: “A domestic 
corporate tax increase will therefore tend to cause an outflow of corporate capital, and in the long run, the 
resulting shortage of capital in the domestic economy will drive up the pre-tax rate of return to wage 
earners, because the lower capital intensity of domestic production will reduce labour productivity and real 
wage rates. Part of the burden may also fall on owners of immobile factors of production such as falling 
land rents and land prices." Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Taxing Profits in a 
Global Economy (Paris: OECD, 1991), p. 34).  
182 Leif Muten International Experience of How Taxes Influence the Movement of Private Capital, 8 Tax 
Notes Int'l 743, 744 (1994) (“If the goal is to facilitate foreign financing of domestic enterprises, and to 
keep foreign borrowing by government from looking too expensive, there is some appeal to leaving interest 
payments to foreign residents outside the tax system. Assuming full shifting to the debtors, foreign 
borrowing will not be made more expensive by such a policy, i.e., from the point of view of the national 
economy.”).    
183 Id. See also Avi Yonah (2000) at 1582.  
184 See Avi Yonah (2000) at 1605, quoting Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, International Tax Competition 
and Gains from Tax Harmonization, 37 Econ. Letters 69, 69-70 (1991) (“If a country adopts the residence 
principle, taxing at the same rate capital income from all sources, then the gross return accruing to an 
individual in that country must be the same, regardless of which country is the source of that return. Thus, 
the marginal product of capital in that country will be equal to the world return to capital. If all countries 
adopt the residence principle, then capital income taxation does not disturb the equality of the marginal 
product of capital across countries which is generated by a free movement of capital.”). 
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foreign equity or debt investment offers an investor a higher rate of return 
than a domestic one, it is reasonable to conclude that the money can best 
be used abroad. Thus, the best tax regime would seem to be one that taxed 
investors the same whether they choose the foreign or domestic security. 
In short, the CEN approach can be resuscitated as a solid basis for taxation 
of income from portfolio investments.185 
Nevertheless, while normally, the interest income will be taxed in residency country, it 
could be avoided by establishing a company in a tax heaven (which does not have 
withholding on interest paid). It is also possible that the residency country will not have 
adequate resources to enforce its rights to tax the income that was forgiven by the source 
country.186 Thus, Professor Avi Yonah has been concerned that portfolio income that is 
not taxed by the source country would not be taxed by the residency country either.187 In 
this case, he points out, CEN will be violated because “the investor would prefer to invest 
in the host country rather than in the home country, even if the pretax yield on the 
domestic investment were higher.”188 
I share the same concern; residency countries must make all the necessary effort to 
exercise their taxing rights and make sure that the interest or dividend income is taxed.   
Thus, in order to achieve CEN and promote economic growth in Country D, residency 
 
185 Frisch (1990) at 587.  
186 See generally Avi Yonah (2000).  
187 Id. at 1583-4 (quoting Joel Slemrod "although it is not desirable to tax capital on a source basis, it is not 
administratively feasible to tax capital on a residence basis…" See also id at 1585 (“in the absence of 
withholding taxes or effective information exchange, income from foreign portfolio investments frequently 
escapes being taxed by any jurisdiction.”).  
188 Id. at 1604.  
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countries should enforce their rights to collect the tax on portfolio investments made in 
other countries.189 This will require exchange of information among countries.190 As 
discussed immediately below, the European Union has adopted a Directive pursuant to 
which interest earned by a taxpayer from one member state in another member state will 
be taxed by the latter state, provided that countries will share all the necessary 
information.191 In addition, the OECD has recently revised Article 26 in the OECD 
Model Treaty to require more exchange of information. These measurements are 
expected to increase the flow of information between countries and ensure that more 
income is taxed by residency countries.  
 
6. The EU Savings Directive 
Council Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income in the form of interest 
payments was issued on June 3, 2003. The purpose of the Savings Directive was:  
to enable savings income, in the form of interest payments made in one 
Member State to "beneficial owners"[footnote omitted] who are individual 
residents for tax purposes in another Member State, to be made subject to 
effective taxation in accordance with the laws of the latter Member State.  
 
189 See Graetz and Grinberg (1997), at 586 (“The key difficulty for residence-based taxation of international 
portfolio income results from the widespread underreporting and evasion that now occurs. Any solution to 
that problem necessarily will require both unilateral and multilateral actions. The good news is that the 
United States has already taken a major step forward in its information reporting requirements for qualified 
financial intermediaries, and recent actions in both the OECD and the EU offer promise of vastly improved 
multinational cooperation. The advent of new financial innovations and the persistence of financial tax 
havens and bank secrecy ensure, however, that there will be many opportunities for improvement for years 
to come.”).  
190 See, generally, Cynthia Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit Information with other Countries: Should Tax 
Compliance or Privacy Claims Prevail?,2005 TNT 44-28. 
191 See “Council Directive 2003/48/EC on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments” 
(Hereinafter “Savings Directive”).  
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The scope of the Savings Directive is limited to taxation of savings income in the form of 
interest payments on debt instruments. In my view, the most important element of the 
Savings Directive was to establish a structured mechanism for exchange of information: 
Where the beneficial owner is resident in a Member State other than that 
in which the paying agent is established, the Directive stipulates that the 
latter must report to the competent authority of its Member State of 
establishment a minimum amount of information, such as the identity and 
residence of the beneficial owner, the name and address of the paying 
agent, the account number of the beneficial owner or, where there is none, 
identification of the debt claim giving rise to the interest, and information 
concerning the interest payment. 
The Savings Directive illustrates that the principle established by the League of Nations 
Report (1923) pursuant to which passive income should be taxed by the residency 
country is still in full force. What the Savings Directive also illustrates is that applying 
residency-based taxation for income from financial transaction must go hand-in-hand 
with comprehensive exchange of information guidance.   
Similarly, the OECD has recently modified Article 26 (Exchange of Information) of the 
OECD Model Treaty and has adopted a Model Tax Information Exchange Agreement, 
both of which address the issue of exchange of information. Under both agreements, 
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exchange of information is mandatory rather than elective and overrides bank secrecy 
provisions in domestic laws.192 
7. Conclusions 
 
In general terms, foreign investors in Country D will not be taxed on interest and 
dividends received from domestic payors, thereby leaving the tax jurisdiction for such 
income to the investor’s residency country.  As set forth in greater detail below, such a 
regime would not constitute a harmful tax competition;193 exempting foreign portfolio 
investment from tax in Country D would simply make Country D’s tax regime similar to 
other tax regimes in developed and developing countries.  
 
This treatment would also be consistent with the relevant provisions in the majority of 
income tax treaties.194 Thus, whether Country D had an income tax treaty with the foreign 
investor’s residency country or not would not matter since in either case, the residency 
country will collect the tax.  
 
C. Taxation of Derivative Transactions195
192 See Prepared Testimony of Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, University of 
Michigan Law School Before the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Hearing on 
Offshore Transactions (Aug. 01, 2006), published in 2006 TNT 148-42.   
193 For a seminal article on tax competition, see Charles Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," 
Journal of Political Economy, October 1956, pp. 416-24. See also OECD, Harmful Tax Competition: An 
Emerging Global Issue (Paris: OECD, April 1998), at 14 (defining harmful tax competition as "free riding" 
that "may hamper the application of progressive tax rates and the achievement of redistributive goals.").  
194 Ault (1992) at 571 (“the treaty structure has been developed explicitly to allocate taxing claims with 
respect to international income.”).  
195 For an excellent overview of what are derivatives, who uses them, for what purposes, and how are they 
taxed (and how should derivatives be taxed), see May (1995) and Rosenbloom (1996), both of which were 
written in connection with the IFA Report (1995).  An in-depth discussion on these issues is beyond the 
scope of this article.  
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a. Overview 
 
A derivative instrument is a “contract between two parties that specifies conditions – in 
particular, dates and the resulting values of the underlying variables – under which 
payments, or payoffs, are to be made between the parties.” 196 Derivative instruments 
generally include options, forwards, futures and notional principal contracts.197 
According to Rosenbloom (1996), to some extent, a derivative instrument resembles an 
insurance contract because it is “a device used to shift risk from one party to another.”198 
Options: An option is an agreement pursuant to which the buyer of the option has the 
right but not the obligation to buy from, or to sell to, the seller, a pre-specified number of 
units of underlying asset, for a pre-specified price (strike price) at, or before a specified 
date in the future (expiration date).199 
196 Rubinstein, Rubinstein on Derivatives Sec. 1 (1999). 
197 See Plambeck, Rosenbloom & Ring, General Report, in 85b Cahiers De Droit Fiscal International,
660-661 (Kluwer 1995) (“In general, financial instruments are contractually created rights and obligations 
to transfer specified amounts of money at specified points in time. The terms of the payments express the 
risks and rewards accepted by each of the parties to the contract. A derivative financial instrument is one 
under which the payment rights and obligations of the parties (and therefore the value of the contract) 
derive from the value of an underlying cash or physical market (e.g., foreign exchange, securities, 
commodities) or from particular indices or combinations of indices.”). 
198 Rosenbloom (1996) at 597. 
199 See Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. No. 12 (2005) (The Tax 
Court provided an excellent overview on the economics of option contracts). A Call option is a contract 
that allows the holder to buy a specified quantity of stock from the writer of the contract at a fixed price for 
a given period. Thus, if the market value of such stock were to fall below the price specified in the option 
contract, the holder normally would not exercise the option and would allow it to lapse. On the other hand, 
if the market value of the underlying stock were to rise above the price specified in the option contract, the 
holder probably would exercise the option before it lapses.  A put option is a contract that allows the holder 
to sell a specified quantity of stock to the writer of the contract at a fixed price during a given period.  Thus, 
if the market value of the stock that is the subject of the option were to rise above the price specified in the 
option contract, the holder of the put normally would not exercise the option and would allow it to lapse. 
On the other hand, if the market value of the underlying stock were to fall below the price specified in the 
option contract, the holder most likely would exercise the put before it lapses. 
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An option is defined for U.S. tax purposes as a contract pursuant to which the writer of 
the option undertakes an obligation to sell to the option holder, or purchase from the 
holder, specific property at a fixed or determinable price and time.200 Generally, options, 
like forward contracts, are also treated as open transactions for United States tax 
purposes.201 
Example of a call option: A holder of the call option pays $10 to the writer of the option 
for the right to purchase IBM stock at $100 from the writer.  
 
Example of a put option: A holder of a put option pays $10 to the writer for the right to 
sell IBM stock at $100 to the writer.   
 
Forward Contracts: A forward contract is an agreement pursuant to which the buyer 
agrees to buy from the seller an underlying asset for a fixed price (delivery price) on a 
single specified date in the future (delivery date), where the terms are initially set so that 
the present value of such a contract is zero.202 “The key difference between [options and 
forward contracts] is that the holder of an option has a right, for which it has generally 
paid a fee or premium, but no obligation. In contrast, the forward creates mutual 
obligations and mutual rights and, since either party may gain as a result of the contract, 
 
200 Rev. Rul. 78-182, 1978-1 C.B. See also Avi Yonah and Swartz (1997); May (1995). 
201 Id. Section 1234(b) governs the treatment for the grantor of options in property, which means options on 
stock, securities, commodities, and commodities futures, provided the option is not otherwise subject to 
section 1256 as described above. For a grantor of an option in property (see below), gain or loss is not 
recognized until the option lapses or expires, is exercised or closed.  Id. The premium received is 
recognized when such sale, exchange, expiration, or closing (offsetting) transaction occurs. When the 
option is exercised, this event is, generally, treated as a non-taxable purchase of the underlying asset by a 
holder of a call or grantor of a put, but as a taxable sale by the other party to the option. 
202 See M. Rubinstein, Rubinstein on Derivatives (1999), Sec. 2.2. 
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it is common that no funds, or premiums, change hands at the inception of the 
contract.”203 
A forward contract is defined for U.S. tax purposes as a privately negotiated contract that 
provides for the sale and purchase of property for a specified price on a specified date.204 
For U.S. tax purposes, until the forward contract is sold, exchanged, settled or allowed to 
lapse, the transaction is treated as open, and any gain or loss to the parties is deferred.205 
Upon the delivery, gain or loss on a forward contract is capital to the extent the asset 
underlying the forward contract would be a capital asset in the taxpayer's hands.206 
Example of a forward contract: A contract entered into on January 1, 2004 between a 
buyer and seller, pursuant to which the seller will sell the buyer 1,000 shares of IBM 
stock for $100, on September 1, 2004.   
 
Futures Contracts: Futures contracts are similar to forward contracts except that they 
are: standardized; traded at regulated futures exchanges; used by clearing organizations; 
 
203 Rosenbloom (1996) at 599.  
204 Glass v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1087, 1101 (1986).  
205 See David S. Miller, Taxpayers' Ability to Avoid Tax Ownership: Current Law and Future Prospects,
51 Tax Lawyer 279, 305 (footnotes 101-104 and accompanying text). In contrast, in the United Kingdom, 
derivatives “are taxed on income account in the amounts recognized for accounting purposes, provided 
that the accounts use either an accruals or mark-to-market method.“ See Robert Moncrieff , Next Steps for 
Debt and Derivatives: The U.K. Finance Act 2002, 4(1) Journal of Taxation of Financial Products (2003).  
206 See May (1995) (explaining that “That result seems relatively unsurprising in the case of a forward. No 
cash passes until the performance date, and the seller does not become entitled to anything until the 
contract period has elapsed.”).   
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subject to daily mark-to-market system; and can be closed before maturity.207 Futures 
contracts are subject to mark-to-market treatment in the U.S. pursuant to section 1256.208 
Notional Principal Contracts: A notional principal contract is a financial instrument 
that provides for the payment of amounts by one party to another at specified intervals 
calculated by reference to a specified index upon a notional principal amount in exchange 
for specified consideration or a promise to pay similar amounts.209 Notional principal 
contracts include interest rate swaps, basis swaps, interest rate caps, interest rate floors, 
commodity swaps, equity swaps, and similar agreements.210 
A swap is a contract pursuant to which the parties agree to exchange payments calculated 
by reference to a notional amount.211 Examples include interest rate swaps, foreign 
currency swaps and equity swaps.  
 
Example of an interest rate swap: Notional amount is $1,000. Party A pays party B an 
amount equal to 5% of the notional amount every year, and party B will pay A an amount 
equal to LIBOR times the notional amount. The amounts from each party are netted.   
 
In the United States, the notional principal contracts regulations group all payments under 
notional principal contracts into three categories: (i) periodic payments; (ii) non-periodic 
 
207 Avi Yonah and Swartz (1997).  
208 Id.  See also May (1995). 
209 Regs. § 1.446-3(c)(1)(i).  
210 Section 1256 contracts, debt instruments, options and forward contracts do not constitute notional 
principal contracts. Regs. § 1.446-3(c)(1)(ii).  
211 See Avi Yonah and Swartz (1997).  
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payments; and (iii) termination payments.212 A party to a notional principal contract must 
annually include in gross income any "net income" from the contract or is allowed to 
deduct any net cost.213 
All taxpayers, regardless of their method of accounting, must recognize the ratable daily 
portion of a periodic payment and a non-periodic payment for the taxable year to which 
such portions relate.214 A non- periodic payment must be amortized and recognized over 
the contract term in a manner that reflects the economic substance of the contract.215 
A termination payment is recognized by the original party to the contract as income or 
deduction when the contract is extinguished, assigned, or exchanged.216 
b. Risk Management and Hedging 
 
Businesses routinely use hedging transactions to manage risks related to movements in 
commodities and securities prices, currencies, and interest rates.217 Instruments available 
to manage such risks include options, futures and forward contracts, and notional 
principal contracts.218 Businesses can hedge assets or liabilities, and can also hedge these 
exposures only in part or only for a limited time.219 
212 May (1995). 
213 Id. see also Regs. § 1.446-3(d). 
214 Regs. § 1.446-3(e)(2)(i) and 1.446-3(f)(2)(i).  
215 Id. 
216 Regs. § 1.446-3(h)(2). 
217 See, generally, David C. Garlock, Federal Income Taxation of Debt Instruments, Chapter 17.01[A] 
(2005 Ed).  
218 Id.  
219 See Avi Yonah and Swartz (1997).  
51
As set forth above, Rosenbloom (1996) observed that: 
 
A derivative usually insures against a financial risk, such as the chance 
that a particular currency will rise or fall in value, that the price of a 
commodity such as corn will rise above or fall below a particular level, or 
that interest rates will move in a particular direction.220 
Most countries do not have specific rules for hedging transactions. In the United States, 
prior to 1993, the tax treatment of hedging transactions was entirely a matter of case law 
and administrative practice.221 In 1988, the Supreme Court in Arkansas Best Corp. v. 
Comm’r held that gain or loss on the sale or exchange of an asset is capital unless the 
asset falls within one of the specifically enumerated exceptions in section 1221.222 In 
Fannie Mae v. Comm’r, the IRS argued that Arkansas Best required the taxpayer to treat 
its hedging losses as capital, but the Tax Court disagreed and held for the taxpayer.223 In 
1993, the IRS issued temporary regulations governing hedging transactions, followed by 
final regulations in 1994.  
 
220 Rosenbloom (1996) at 598 ( Illustrating with the following example: “The holder of an option to 
purchase 100,000 Deutsche marks at 1.3 DM to the dollar is not required to demand payment, and 
presumably will not do so unless the event insured against - the risk - occurs (for instance, the Deutsche 
mark rises to 1.1:1). If that occurs, the holder of the option has an economic incentive to require the option 
writer to sell Deutsche marks at the option price of 1.3 DM to the dollar to the extent specified in the option 
contract. The holder's gain upon the exercise of the option will precisely mirror the risk that 100,000 
Deutsche marks would rise above the designated level.”).  
221 See Corn Products v. Commissioner,  350 U.S. 46 (1955). 
222 Arkansas Best v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988).  
223 Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 541 (1993).  
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Pursuant to section 1221(b)(2), “[t[he term ‘hedging transaction’ means any transaction 
entered into by the taxpayer in the normal course of the taxpayer's trade or business 
primarily (i) to manage risk of price changes or currency fluctuations with respect to 
ordinary property which is held or to be held by the taxpayer, (ii) to manage risk of 
interest rate or price changes or currency fluctuations with respect to borrowings made or 
to be made, or ordinary obligations incurred or to be incurred, by the taxpayer, or (iii) to 
manage such other risks as the Secretary may prescribe in regulations.”224 
Example of hedging prices of commodities: Corporation X is a corn processor that uses 
grain corn to manufacture products such as corn starch.  On July 1, X enters into a 
contract to deliver to a customer a fixed quantity of starch at a fixed price in October. 
Because of limited storage space, X will not purchase the corn needed to fulfill the starch 
contract until September. If the market price of corn increases between July and 
September, X’s profit on the starch contract would be reduced or eliminated.225 To 
protect itself against such risk, X enters into a long futures contract on corn (e.g., a
contract to buy corn).   In September, X will buy and take physical delivery of the corn 
needed to fulfill the starch contract, and at the same time settle the futures contract by 
 
224 Section 1221(b)(2).  May (1995) elaborates that “The definition [of hedging transaction] contains 
several key requirements. First, the taxpayer must identify the relevant contract or other position as a 
hedge. Second, the hedged item must be an ordinary, rather than a capital, asset or obligation. Third, 
changes in the value of the hedge must offset changes in the value of the hedged item. Finally, after taking 
into account the taxpayer's other positions, the hedge must reduce the taxpayer's overall exposure to the 
relevant risk.”   
225 See Garlock (2005) at 17.01[A]. 
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either making or receiving a termination payment f cash.  The amount paid or received to 
terminate the futures contract will offset a decrease or increase in X’s cost of corn, and 
thus profit on the starch contract.  The result is that X has effectively locked in the future 
purchase price of the corn needed to fulfill the customer order, and X’s profit will not be 
affected by changes in the price of corn.226 
Example of hedge of a debt liability (interest rate risk): An issuer (party A) of $1,000 
debt paying LIBOR wishes to hedge against the risk that LIBOR will increase (i.e., 
increases the issuer’s costs). To manage such risk, the issuer enters into an interest rate 
swap with party B pursuant to which A will pay B 5% fixed on a notional amount of 
$1,000, while B will pay LIBOR on the same notional amount. The result is that A’s 
borrowing costs are now fixed at 5%.227 
In general, hedging transactions are awarded a special treatment in the United States.228 
The rationale is clear – hedging transaction should be encouraged, since risk management 
is a crucial element in the economy.229 As discussed in greater detail below, taxation of 
income from cross-border derivatives that serve as hedging transaction could have a 
 
226 Id.  
227 Id.  
228 See generally Treas. Reg. §1.1221-2 (Matching ordinary gains with ordinary losses on the hedging 
transaction and the hedged item) and Treas. Reg. §1.446-4 (Matching hedging gains and losses to gains and 
losses on hedged items).  
229 See Conference Report for the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, H.R. Rep. No. 213, 103d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 616 (1993) (emphasized the importance of hedging transactions to the United States 
economy). See also Thuronyi ( 2001) at 264.  
54
significant impact on the ability of domestic businesses to manage their risk of doing 
business.230 
c. Cross-border Aspects of Derivatives 
 
As opposed to the portfolio investment issue discussed above, there is more 
“international consensus” concerning taxation of cross-border derivatives.231 The forty-
ninth Congress of the International Fiscal Association (“IFA”) focused upon tax aspects 
of derivative financial instruments and issued its recommendations to deal with cross-
border aspects of derivatives.232 The IFA Report (1995) set forth that the international 
consensus for taxation of cross-border derivatives is that the source country generally 
does not impose tax earned by non-resident on income from derivatives.233 
Nevertheless, before addressing the cross-border aspects of income from derivatives, the 
jurisdiction must establish basic timing and character principles for taxation of 
derivatives in general: 
 
230 See e.g., David Garlock, Yoram Keinan, Howard Leventhal, and Alan Munro, Proposals Regarding the 
Taxation of Credit Default Swaps, 18 J. Tax'n F. Inst. 5 (2005) (advocating residency-based taxation for 
credit default swaps).  
231 See Rosenbloom (1996) at 602-3, citing the IFA Report (1995) at 684-6.  See also Thuronyi (2001) at 
270 (agreeing that such a consensus exists but providing two examples of countries (Mexico and Greece) 
that withhold on income from derivatives under their domestic laws).  
232 See generally IFA Report (1995). See also Rosenbloom (1996) at 602-3 (“the only ‘pure’ international 
issue raised by such instruments pertains to taxation in the country of source on a gross basis. It is here that 
close analysis of the special features of derivatives is required, and here, if anywhere, that derivatives place 
pressure on the international rules. The question posed is whether the country from which payment is made 
under a derivative financial instrument should have the right to impose tax on that payment.”).  
233 See IFA Report (1995) at 684-6; Rosenbloom (1996) at 603.   
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The promulgation of a single, consistent set of rules to tax derivative 
transactions is a daunting task that must be approached on two levels. 
Such a system first must be crafted to reach fair and consistent results with 
regard to the use of derivative products among U.S. parties. Assuming this 
goal could be achieved, the resulting rules also must be designed to 
produce the same consistent results with respect to cross-border derivative 
transactions.234 
Absent tax considerations, local businesses typically would be indifferent between 
entering into a derivative with a domestic or foreign counterparty — price is the 
dominant consideration.235 However, if a payment to or from a foreign counterparty were 
subject to withholding tax in Country D, that consideration undoubtedly would outweigh 
any price differential, so the effect of a withholding tax would be simply to eliminate 
foreign counterparties from the domestic market — an unwarranted result, in my view.236 
In the case of developing countries, the vast majority of derivative transactions will be 
between local businesses and foreign counterparties because the local derivative markets 
are probably undeveloped.237 Thus, participation of foreign parties in the domestic market 
 
234 Avi Yonah and Swartz (1997), citing the IFA Report (1995). See also Rosenbloom (1996) at 601 (“The 
subject of derivative financial instruments is international to a limited extent. The most pressing tax issues 
pertaining to derivatives are basic and thus domestic: What is to be taxed, and when? What character does 
the resulting income or loss have? These are largely domestic matters, in the sense that they apply to 
transactions between resident taxpayers in a given jurisdiction.”).    
235 In general, foreign counterparties would provide domestic businesses with better prices than domestic 
counterparties.   
236 See generally, IFA Report (1995). See also Thuronyi at 271 (2001) (“The result will be that the 
withholding tax will, in effect, preclude domestic taxpayers from entering into derivative agreements with 
taxpayers resident in non-treaty partners…”).  
237 Thuronyi (2001) at 264.  
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is essential not only because it increases the liquidity in the market, but also because it 
provides access to derivatives to more domestic businesses by virtue of providing more 
choices and better prices.238 
Another consideration relevant to foreign counterparties is whether entering into a 
derivative transaction with domestic counterparties could be construed as the conduct of a 
trade or business in Country D.239 This too could have the practical effect of barring 
foreign counterparties from the domestic derivative market in Country D. This issue is 
discussed below in the next chapter.  
 
In general, the United States uses “a residence- based sourcing rule to waive source-based 
claims on the derivative instrument income of nonresident foreign persons.”240 Thus, 
unless the gain on a derivative is connected with a U.S. trade or business or U.S. real 
estate, it is not U.S.-source income.241 As set forth above, the definition of FDAP income 
in the U.S. is very broad and includes various types of income.242 The income need not 
even be annual or periodical, so a single payment could also constitute FDAP.243 
Nevertheless, certain specific exceptions exist, one of which is for gains from the sale of 
property, including option premiums.244 
238 Id. at 271.  
239 See Prop. Reg. 1.864(b)-1. 
240 See May (1995).  
241 Id. See also See Charles T. Plambeck et al., General Report [hereinafter General Report] in 80b Cahiers 
de Droit Fiscal International 653 (1995). A Similar approach is applied in the United Kingdom. See 
Moncrieff (2003) (“Payments made in respect of derivative contracts have traditionally fallen outside 
withholding tax requirements and this has been confirmed in the 2002 rules.”).    
242 Reg. § 1.1441-2(b)(1)(i). 
243 Reg. § 1.1441-2(b)(1)(ii). 
244 Reg. § 1.1441-2(b)(2)(i). 
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There is no specific exception from FDAP income for payments under a notional 
principal contract; nevertheless, pursuant to Reg. § 1.863-7(b), if the foreign counterparty 
is not engaged in a U.S. trade or business, a payor of periodic payments under a notional 
principal contract is not required to withhold on its periodic payments to the foreign 
counterparty because the payment will be treated as having a foreign source.245 The 
source of the periodic payments under a notional principal contract is the residence of the 
recipient of the income and not the residence of the payor.246 While this looks like a 
formal source rule, according to David Hariton (on behalf of the New York State Bar 
Association Tax Section) the source of income from notional principal contracts 
contained in Reg. §1.863-7 is where the activities relating to the notional principal 
contract itself took place.247 Other countries, however, have attempted to trace the risk 
being managed by derivatives; in Argentina and Columbia, for example, income from 
derivatives has domestic source if the undertaken risk is therein.248 
245 The definition of a notional principal contract under Reg. § 1.863-7(a) is the same as that under Reg. 
§ 1.446-3(c).  See also Reg. § 1.1441-4(a)(3), pursuant to which payments with respect to a notional 
principal contract described in Reg. § 1.863-7(a) are not subject to U.S. withholding tax. For an in-depth 
discussion on the cross-border aspects of financial instruments, see Avi-Yonah and Swartz (1997).   
246 Reg. § 1.863-7(a).  See also Reg. 1.988-4(a) for foreign currency swaps. Special rules apply to payments 
on notional principal contracts that are classified as “embedded loans.”  
247 See Hariton, David P. (on behalf of the New York State Bar Association Tax Section), Credit Default 
Swaps, 40 Tax Notes Int'l 545, at note 120 (“While Treas. Reg. section 1.863-7 is often thought of as 
providing a rule that notional principal contract payments to a foreign person are foreign source, that is not 
true if the payments constitute effectively connected income. In that case, the payment is treated as U.S.-
source income. Treas. Reg. section 1.863-7(b)(3).”)   
248 Teijeiro, Guillermo O. Argentine Anti-Avoidance Rules: Application Under Domestic And International 
Conventional Law, 32 Tax Notes Int'l 67 (Aug. 21, 2003), citing Argentina income tax law, First section 
(unnumbered) after sec. 7. “[R]isk is considered situated in Argentina whenever the party to the transaction 
obtaining the income is a resident in Argentina or a domestic permanent establishment of a foreign 
company.” Id. See also Andrade, Mario, A Tax Overview of Derivatives Transactions in Colombia, 22 Tax 
Notes Int'l 3080 (June 1, 2001) (“If the transaction is cross-border between a resident and a nonresident, it 
must be determined where the coverage service is rendered. If the services are rendered by a Colombian 
resident, any payment abroad is considered as national-source income subject to Colombia's 35 percent 
corporate income tax, plus an additional 7 percent remittance tax, net of income tax, for a fixed 39.55 
percent rate.”). 
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As of today, there are no specific source rules in the United States for gains or losses on 
options, forward contracts and futures contract.249 In addition, there are no source rules 
for income from other types of payments under a notional principal contract (i.e., non-
periodic and termination payments).250 Thus, under the normal source rules for sales of 
property contained in section 865, the source of gain from such derivative contracts is 
similar to the source of capital gain.251 
While the general consensus among countries is that income from cross-border 
derivatives is taxed by the residency country, several alternatives to reach such result 
have emerged.252 In Canada, for example, a different approach but with similar result is 
applied.253 In general, if a non-resident does not have trade or business in Canada, 
payments received by such non-resident under options, forward contracts or swaps are 
generally not subject to Canadian tax if none of these payments can reasonably be 
characterized as interest, dividend, or rental payments (which is normally the case).254 
Similarly, in the United Kingdom: 
 
249 See Avi Yonah and Swartz (1997). Section 865(j)(2) gave the IRS the authority to issue regulations 
pertaining to the source of income from forward contracts, but such regulations have yet to be issued. Id.   
250 Id.  
251 Id. See also May (1995) (explaining that “The income realized from forwards, futures, and options is 
gain. Unless the gain is connected with a U.S. business or U.S. real estate, [ footnote omitted] it is not U.S.-
source income because it takes its source from the recipient's foreign residence.”); David F. Levy, Towards 
Equal Tax Treatment of Economically Equivalent Financial Instruments: Proposals For Taxing Prepaid 
Forward Contracts, Equity Swaps, and Certain Contingent Debt Instruments, 97 TNT 188-98 (September 
25, 1997).   
252 See Rosenbloom (1996) at 603, citing the IFA Report (1995).  
253 See Bernstein, Jack, Jondahl, Sky and Nicholls, Andrew, The Canadian Treatment of Derivatives, 37 
Tax Notes Int'l 587 (2005). 
254 Id.  
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Payments made in respect of derivative contracts have traditionally fallen 
outside withholding tax requirements and this has been confirmed in the 
2002 rules. However, although derivative payments themselves may not 
be subject to withholding tax, derivative contracts may include items such 
as interest payments that are currently, and that continue to be, subject to 
the withholding tax provisions.255 
The source rules pertaining to notional principal contracts in the United States were first 
established by the IRS in 1987,256 and shortly after were regulated under Reg. § 1.863-7.    
Although not stated formally, the reason behind the special rule was to permit cross-
border notional principal contracts without the impediment of a withholding tax.257 This 
principle is consistent, of course, with the recommendations in the IFA Report (1995) 
that is discussed below. 
 
I can think of no reason why this policy should not apply equally to developing 
countries.258 As stated above, the opposite policy would not result in the collection of any 
tax revenues; it would simply eliminate foreign persons as potential counterparties for 
derivative transactions. In general, derivatives are mainly used for hedging and 
speculation purposes.259 With respect to hedging, it is generally accepted that risk 
 
255 See Moncrieff (2003).  
256 See Rev. Rul. 87-5, 1987-1 C.B. 180. Two year before, the New York State Bar Tax Section issued a 
report that advocated no withholding tax on swap payments. See New York State Bar Association Examines 
Whether Payments To Foreigner In Interest Rate Swap Agreement are Subject To Withholding, 85 TNT 
118-52.   
257 See Rosenbloom (1996); Thuronyi (2001) 
258 Id.  
259 Id. at 597-98 (1996) (“A derivative financial instrument is a device used to shift risk from one party to 
another. On this fundamental point, derivatives resemble insurance, a concept familiar to anyone who has 
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management is a crucial element in every business’s growth.260 Thus, Country D would 
clearly want to allow local businesses to manage their risk by entering into derivatives 
with foreign counterparties (assuming that the local banks could not satisfy this need).261 
Nevertheless, foreign counterparties will hesitate to enter into hedging transactions with 
businesses in Country D if income from such transactions will be subject to tax in the 
source country.   
 
As set forth above, the IFA Report (1995) discussed the issue of cross-border derivatives 
and reached several resolutions to promote sensible, consistent worldwide taxation of 
derivatives.262 The IFA Report (1995) first acknowledged that countries should 
recognize the importance of derivative transactions remove tax impediments to the use of 
derivative instruments.263 In accordance with general tax policy principles, the IFA 
Report (1995) concluded that the tax rules for derivatives should be fair, simple, and 
 
purchased a vehicle or home. In an insurance transaction one party pays a fee, or premium, to another. In 
return, the other party undertakes the risk of paying the first party up to a specified amount in the event of a 
specified occurrence (such as a theft or fire). If the occurrence comes to pass, the first party has a claim 
against the second, which gives value to the insurance contract. That value depends on, or derives from, the 
occurrence, which is typically beyond the influence or control of either party, and the extent of the resulting 
loss. If the occurrence does not come to pass, the contract expires without having any value to the first 
party. Yet, such a transaction is sensible because, during the specified period, the insured was relieved of 
the risk of suffering loss as a result of the specified event by shifting the economic burden of that risk to the 
insurer.”). 
260 Colon (1999) at 777 (“Financial instruments permit firms to transfer financial price risks to other 
investors better able or more willing to bear such risks. Financial instruments help firms to lower their 
financing costs and hedge more efficiently in both specific transactions, such as the purchase or sale of 
products in foreign currency, as well as in strategic cash flow hedging.”).  
261 See Andrade, Mario, A Tax Overview of Derivatives Transactions in Colombia, 22 Tax Notes Int'l 3080 
(June 1, 2001) (“Operations with derivatives have recently started to expand in Colombia. Normally, 
investors and economic agents choose those types of operations when market fluctuations make the return 
on an investment or the feasibility of a transaction riskier. Because of the volatility of some indexes of the 
region -- such as interest rates, the exchange rate, and the prices of basic products -- more national and 
foreign investors are making use of those instruments.”).    
262 Tax Aspects of Derivative Financial Instruments, 49th IFA Cong. Res. (Cannes 1995). See also Michael 
Cosgrove, IFA Stresses Role of Derivatives, Calls on Nations to Establish New Tax Regimes, 65 BNA's 
Banking Rep. 507 (1995). 
263 See Avi Yonah and Swartz (1997). 
61
practical: (i) different classes of taxpayers and different instruments that are economically 
similar should be similarly treated; (ii) the rules must apply consistently over time as 
derivative instruments change; and (iii) the use of derivative instruments should have 
definite and predictable results.264 
The IFA Report (1995) also discussed the appropriate source rules for income 
from derivatives and sets forth that: 
 
Countries should not impose source basis taxation on income derived by 
non-residents from derivative instruments in the absence of a branch or 
permanent establishment to which such income is attributable. 
 
It is the general practice not to impose withholding tax at source on 
payments made under derivative financial instruments. This is appropriate 
and should be universally adopted 
 
Apart from withholding tax, profits, gains and losses with respect to 
derivative instruments should be exempted from tax at source under 
domestic law or applicable income tax treaties on the ground that they 
represent: 
- business profits, exempt from tax in the absence of a permanent 
establishment 
- capital gains; or 
 
264 Id.  
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- "other income" exempt under the "other income" article of an applicable 
treaty.265 
Six years later, Victor Thuronyi (Senior Counsel (Taxation) with the International 
Monetary Fund) stated that the same rationale should apply to developing countries: 
 
In the case of certain [New Financial Instruments], particularly 
derivatives, tax policy concerns militate against the imposition of a 
withholding tax because the payments under some financial instruments 
may not be closely correlated with the income actually earned. This is 
particularly the case for swap payments. There is a risk, therefore, that if a 
gross basis tax is imposed at source, taxpayers simply will not enter into 
the type of transaction subject to withholding, because the withholding 
would be out of proportion to the amount of income involved. [footnote 
omitted] Such a policy may deny to domestic companies the risk-shifting 
benefits that new financial instruments can provide.266 
265 See the IFA Report (1995) at para 2.3. Paragraph 2.4 elaborates that “In imposing residence taxation on 
income derived from derivative instruments, the residence principle should be: (a) reinforced by application 
of a country's anti-deferral regimes, where appropriate; and (b) clarified in the case of global trading, split 
hedging, and interbranch transactions. In this connection, countries should consider entering into Advance 
Pricing Agreements in appropriate cases. In computing the taxable income of a branch of a foreign 
taxpayer, inter-branch or branch/home office transactions in derivative instruments are taken into account 
in some countries but not in others. The treatment of these transactions should be harmonized and the 
OECD should be encouraged to continue its work on the subject.”  
266 See Thuronyi (2001) at 261, citing for this view C. Plambeck, H.D. Rosenbloom, and D. Ring, "General 
Report," 85b Cahiers de droit fiscal international (1995); L. Lokken, "Taxation of derivatives and new 
financial instruments," in Report of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax 
Matters on the Work of its Eighth Meeting (UN 1998). 
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Note that Mr. Thuronyi specifically acknowledges that domestic businesses will benefit 
from more access to risk-shifting instruments if the souce country will not withhold on 
such instruments.  
 
Another potential policy argument for these source rules is that, in contrast to payments 
on stock or debt, where the recipient has invested capital in an income-producing asset in 
Country D, a swap is merely a contractual arrangement that gives rise to cash flows on a 
notional amount.267 Interest and dividends can flow only to the investor, but cash flows 
on notional principal contracts can flow in either direction. While Country D may wish to 
reserve the right to taxing priority on income from capital invested therein, there is no 
reason for a priority claim for taxation of cash flows on contractual cash flows out of the 
country.268 
As set forth above, in the United States, the IRS and several commentators have raised 
the concern that with respect to equity swaps, such source rules could be used to replicate 
payments subject to U.S. withholding, such as dividends from a U.S. corporation, and 
convert such payments into exempt swap payments.269 These concerns, however, should 
 
267 See Garlock et. al. (2005).  
268 Id.  
269 See Yaron Reich (1998); Preamble to prop. Treas. reg. section 1.864(b)-1, (June 11, 1998); Preamble to 
the Section 446 Regulations, T.D. 849, 58 Fed. Reg. 53125 (Oct. 14, 1993) ("[T]he IRS is considering 
whether notional principal contracts involving certain specified indices (e.g., one issuer's stock) should be 
excluded from the general sourcing rules of Section 861 through 865..."); Preamble to Proposed 
Regulations under Section 1058, 1992-1 CB 1196 ("The Service is considering whether the proposed 
regulations should apply to dividend equivalent payments made in connection with certain notional 
principal contracts, such as an equity index swap structured to replicate the cash flows that would arise 
from an installment purchase of one or more equity securities"); New York State Bar Ass'n Tax Section, 
"Report on the Imposition of U.S. Withholding Tax on Substitute and Derivative Dividend Payments 
Received by Foreign Persons," Highlights & Documents, June 5, 1998, p. 2869; Avi-Yonah and Swartz 
(1997); Colon (1999). 
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not apply if consistent with my proposals in the previous part, interest and dividends are 
largely exempt from withholding tax.   
 
d. Taxation of Cross Border Derivatives under Treaties 
 
The characterization of payments for treaty purposes is important because different 
characterization could mean different rates imposed on income from cross-border 
financial instrument.270 In addition, special issues may arise if the payment is 
characterized inconsistently in the country of source and the country of residency.271 
“The existing network of tax treaties places significant constraints on countries' freedom 
of action in imposing a withholding tax on derivatives.”272 Generally, income from 
derivatives could fall under business income (Article 7), dividends (Article 10), interest 
income (Article 11), capital gain (Article 13) or other income (Article 21).273 Under all 
provisions, according to both the U.S. and OECD models, income would generally be 
taxable only in the residence country.274 
There is little doubt that when income from derivatives is attributable to the non-
resident’s permanent establishment in the source country, such income should be taxed 
 
270 For example, as discussed above, if a payment is classified as interest, it may be subject to lower rates 
then if such payment would be treated as a dividend.  
271 For examples of how foreign investors can avoid U.S. withholding taxes using derivatives, see Colon 
(1999); Gregory May, Flying on Instruments: Synthetic Investment and the Avoidance of Withholding Tax,
73 Tax Notes 1225 (1996); Thuronyi (2001).  
272 Thuronyi (2001) at 268. 
273 See Bruce A. Elvin, The Recharacterization Of Cross-Border Interest Rate Swaps: Tax Consequences 
and Beyond, 96 TNI 32-21 (citing from Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Taxation of New Financial Instruments (1994); Thuronyi (2001) at 268-9.   
274 Id.  
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by the source country under Article 7.275 Of course, as discussed above, this will require a 
two-step determination of whether the non-resident has a permanent establishment in the 
source country and if so, whether the income is attributable to such permanent 
establishment.    
 
The dividend articles of many U.S. tax treaties generally define dividends as "income 
from shares . . . as well as income from other corporate rights which is subjected to the 
same taxation treatment as income from shares" in the country where the distributing 
company resides.276 According to May (1995), this could establish the authority to tax 
payments under an equity swap.277 
As to the interest article, in general, payments under a derivative are not treated as 
interest because they are not compensation for the use of money.278 The only case where 
payments under a derivative could be subject to the interest provision is in the case of a 
significant non-periodic payment in a swap that could be treated as an embedded loan 
under the source country’s domestic laws.279 
275 Id.  
276 See May (1995), citing 1981 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty, Article. 10(3). 
277 Id. See also Avi Yonah and Swartz (1997).  
278 Thuronyi (2001) at 269. 
279 Id. (Illustrating as follows: “party A makes a payment to party B of US $ 1,000, then B pays A US $ 100 
for 5 years and US $ 1,100 in the sixth and final year. This is nothing but a loan at 10 percent annual 
interest, even though the payments are called swap payments. Under a rule that treated as interest the 
implicit interest due to differences in timing of payments under a swap, an appropriate portion of the 
payments would be characterized as interest.”). 
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Nevertheless, some treaties do not follow the existing models as far as the "other income" 
article is concerned, or do not contain an "other income" article.280 Moreover, under the 
U.N. Model Treaty, “other income” arising in a contracting state may be taxed in that 
state (i.e., the source country).281 “Thus, a country which has followed the UN Model in 
its treaties will be able to impose a tax on payments under derivatives if it wishes, in 
circumstances where these payments are properly characterized as other income.”282 
As of today, there is no specific provision in any tax treaty that allocates the tax on 
income from derivatives.283 It is, therefore, strongly suggested that countries will consider 
adopting a specific provision in their tax treaties to address this issue. Consistent with the 
international consensus over the appropriate treatment of income from derivatives 
discussed in this article, such a provision should specify that income from a derivative 
transaction should generally be taxed by the residency country, unless it falls under other 
treaty provisions such as interest (in the case of embedded loans).  Obviously, the U.S., 
OECD and U.N. can assist in revising their treaty models to include specific rules for 
derivatives.      
 
D. Investing and Trading in Securities 
280 Thuronyi (2001) at 269. (The “other income” article exists in most U.S. treaties and in most cases; it 
allows the country of residency to tax unspecified “other income.” See for example, treaties with Germany, 
France and the Netherlands, and article 21(1) to the 1996 U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty).  
281 Id.     
282 Id.  
283 See OECD Report (1994) ("there is no consistency in the way countries classify [derivatives] payments 
when applying treaties.").  
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As set forth above, if a foreign person conducts business activities in the United States, it 
will generally be subject to U.S. income tax on its income effectively connected with that 
trade or business.284 This standard is generally accepted by most countries as well as in 
tax treaties (only the standard is income that is “attributable” to a “permanent 
establishment”).285 
The U.S. Tax Code provides safe harbor exceptions, however, for business activities that 
consist of (i) trading in securities and commodities through an independent agent in the 
United States (if the taxpayer does not maintain a U.S. office through which the 
transactions are effected) and (ii) for trading in securities and commodities for the 
taxpayer’s own account (if the taxpayer is not a dealer).286 In general, this safe harbor is 
applicable to traders and investors in securities but not to dealers.287 
“Securities” are defined for this purpose as "any note, bond, debenture, or other evidence 
of indebtedness, or any evidence of an interest in or right to subscribe to or purchase any 
of the foregoing; and the effecting of transactions in stocks or securities includes buying, 
selling (whether or not by entering into short sales), or trading in stocks, securities, or 
contracts or options to buy or sell stocks or securities, on margin or otherwise, for the 
 
284 See InverWorld v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 1996-301, at 72.   
285 See, for example, Bernstein, Jack, Jondahl, Sky and Nicholls, Andrew,Canadian Tax Treatment of Index 
Participation Units And Exchange- Traded Index Derivatives, 37 Tax Notes Int’l 587 (2005).  
286 Pursuant to Section 864(b)(2)(A)(ii), a non-resident is not treated as being engaged in a trade or business 
within the United States for trading in stocks or securities on its own account, either directly or through an 
agent. Section 864(b)(2)(B) provides safe harbor for trading in commodities.  
287 See sections 864(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(B)(ii).  For the definition of a “dealer” for this purpose, see David 
Hariton, (on behalf of the New York State Bar Association Tax Section), Credit Default Swaps, 40 Tax 
Notes Int'l 545 (Sept. 09, 2005) (“dealers transact with customers, while traders and investors act for their 
own account.”) 
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account and risk of the taxpayer, and any other activity closely related thereto (such as 
obtaining credit for the purpose of effectuating such buying, selling, or trading)."288 
While these safe harbors were originally enacted prior to the explosion in the use of 
derivatives, the Treasury and the IRS have endeavored to modernize the rules by issuing 
proposed regulations that would extend the safe harbors to trading in a wide variety of 
derivatives, including interest rate, currency, equity and commodity notional principal 
contracts.289 In many cases, derivatives are entered into for the purpose of hedging a 
position in stocks, securities, or commodities, and the securities and commodities trading 
safe harbors apply to such derivatives.290 Thus, non-residents trading in securities and 
derivatives in the United States will not be treated as having income that is effectively 
connected to a US trade or business.291 Dealers in derivatives and securities, however, 
will be subject to U.S. tax, as discussed below.   
 
The United States Congress first enacted the securities trading safe harbor in 1936 to 
provide certainty that non-residents who merely trade stocks and securities would not be 
subject to the net income tax regime.292 The two-prong rationale was that: (i) ordinary 
income from U.S. stocks and securities (e.g., interest and dividends) would be subject to 
U.S. taxation through the withholding tax on FDAP income, and (ii) activities beyond the 
 
288 Treas. Reg. 1.864-2(b)(2)(i). 
289 Prop. Reg. § 1.864(b)-1, 63 F.R. 32164-32166 (“According to the Service, regulations on the safe harbor 
provisions in section 864(b) have not been issued since 1972. Since then, it says, the use of derivative 
financial instruments has increased significantly. To reflect that development, the Service says, new 
regulations addressing the ways taxpayers customarily use derivative transactions are needed.”).  
290 Treas. Reg. 1.864-2(c)(2)(i), (d)(2)(i). 
291 See May (1995).  
292 Section 211(b), Revenue Act of 1936, Pub. L. 74-740, 49 Stat. 1648, 1714-15 (1936); S. Rep. No. 2156, 
74th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1936). 
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scope of the safe harbor (e.g., dealers) would be subject to net tax if the taxpayer was 
engaged in a trade or business or had an office in the United States.293 
Thirty years later, the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966 expanded the safe harbors to 
include trading activities conducted by or on behalf of a non-U.S. resident taxpayer 
through a U.S. office for the foreign taxpayer's own account.294 
The unmistaken purpose of these safe harbors was to encourage foreign persons to invest 
in U.S. capital markets without subjecting them to U.S. income tax.295 The safe harbors 
are generally very broad and aimed at various types of passive investments.296 The 
 
293 Id.  
294 See Section 102(d), Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-809,80 Stat. 1539, 1544 (1966); S. 
Rep. No. 1701, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17, 22-23, 32-33 (1966).  
295 H. Rep No. 1450, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1966), p. 6. See also David Hariton, (on behalf of the New 
York State Bar Association Tax Section), Credit Default Swaps, 40 Tax Notes Int'l 545 (Sept. 9, 2005) 
(“For foreign entities, a special statutory rule provides that foreign entities that are traders or investors (but 
not dealers) in securities or commodities may carry on their securities activities in the United States without 
being subject to U.S. net income tax, but subject to U.S. withholding tax applicable to investment flows. 
Under congressional policy dating back to the 1940s, those safe harbor rules have been amended by 
Congress and interpreted by the IRS in a manner that encourages offshore investors, including special 
purpose vehicles managed by U.S. investment advisers, to invest and trade in U.S. securities.”); Colon  
(1999) at 783-4 (“To encourage foreigners to invest in U.S. capital markets without becoming engaged in a 
U.S. trade or business, Congress enacted two statutory safe harbors in the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 
1996, one for trading in securities and commodities through an independent agent and the other for trading 
for the taxpayer's own account in securities and commodities.”); Yaron Reich (1998).   
296 See H.R. Rep. No. 1450, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 and S. Rep. No. 1707, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (“a 
nonresident alien individual or foreign corporation who is not a dealer in stocks or securities is not engaged 
in trade or business within the United States by reason of trading in stocks or securities for the taxpayer's 
own account, irrespective of where the activities instrumental to such trading are performed or how the 
actual trading transactions are effected. It is immaterial whether the corporation or individual conducts 
the trading activities and effects the stock or security transactions himself or through his employee or uses 
agents in the United States, whether independent or dependent, to perform any or all the functions 
instrumental to such trading. It is also immaterial whether any such employee or agent, wherever located, is 
authorized to exercise his own discretion in trading activities conducted, or in effecting transactions, on 
behalf of his employer or principal. Moreover, the volume of stock or security transactions affected during 
the taxable year is not material ... [Emphasis added.].  
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volume of trading does not matter, as long as there is no fixed place of business in the 
U.S.297 
Another important reason for the trading insecurities exemption was that taxing such non-
residents on gains from trading in securities is impractical. As set forth in the legislative 
history of section 864(b): 
 
[A] nonresident alien will not be subject to the tax on capital 
 gains, including so-called gains from hedging transactions, as 
 at present, it having been found administratively impossible 
 effectually to collect this latter tax. It is believed this 
 exemption from tax will result in considerable additional 
 revenue from the transfer taxes and from the income tax in the 
 case of persons carrying on the brokerage business.298 
I believe that similar securities trading safe harbors should similarly apply to investors 
and traders conducting business in Country D because the same policy considerations that 
led the United States’ Congress to encourage passive investment by foreign investors in 
the United States are applicable to developing countries.  
 
297 Id. see also Reg. §§ 1.864-2(c)(i) and (d)(i).  
298 Senate Report No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2d sess., p. 21. 
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As to tax treaties, as discussed above, the source country generally can tax gains 
attributable to a “permanent establishment.” Thus, non-resident with no “permanent 
establishment” in the host country will be taxed in the residency country: 
 
A foreign person engaged in derivative transactions has a U.S. permanent 
establishment if the person or a dependent agent has a U.S. office through 
which it regularly takes material steps to acquire, manage, or dispose of 
derivative contracts. [footnote omitted] As a practical matter, foreign 
persons in the derivatives business will have a permanent establishment if 
they have a fixed place of business under the U.S. domestic rules.299 
E. Credit Default Swaps (CDSs)
A recent debate in the United States over the appropriate tax treatment of cross-border 
CDSs illustrates that the United States still considers tax measurements to attract foreign 
counterparties to transact with domestic businesses.300 
In a typical CDS transaction one party (the “Protection Buyer”) enters into a contract 
with another party (the “Protection Seller, typically a foreign party) to obtain the right to 
a payment in the event of a default (the “Default”)301 by a third-party obligor (the 
 
299 See May (2005).  
300 See Notice 2004-52, 2004-32 I.R.B. 168 (Aug. 9, 2004). 
301 In general, a Default constitutes an issuer’s failure to make payments on any of its obligations when due, 
typically upon insolvency or bankruptcy. See David Nirenberg and Steven Kopp, Tax Treatment of Total 
Return Swaps, Default Swaps and Credit Linked Notes, 87 J. TAX’N 82 (1997) (hereinafter “Nirenberg and 
Kopp (1997)”). Credit events may also include a specified price change in the Reference Entity’s debt or a 
rating downgrade. See Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for 
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“Reference Entity”) on a debt obligation issued by that entity (the “Reference 
Obligation”). The Protection Buyer need not own the Reference Obligation. The 
Protection Buyer pays the Protection Seller either a single lump sum or periodic 
payments.302 In return, the Protection Buyer has the right to receive either (i) a cash 
payment, equal to the difference between the Reference Obligation’s value at the date the 
CDS was established and its value at the time of the Default, or (ii) the right to deliver the 
Reference Obligation to the Protection Seller for cash equal to its face amount.303 A CDS 
can cover the credit risk of a single Reference Obligation, various debt obligations of a 
single Reference Entity, or a group of Reference Obligations issued by different 
entities.304 
In general, taxpayers other than dealers enter into CDSs for one of the following reasons: 
(i) a holder of a Reference Obligation can become a Protection Buyer to hedge the credit 
 
the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 Wash. U.L.Q. 619, 677 (1999) (hereinafter “Partnoy (1999)”).  Thus, a 
Default may indicate a decline in the creditworthiness of the issuer of the Reference Obligation. See 
Jonathan Talisman and Joseph Mikrut, Writers Make Second Request for Guidance on Credit Default 
Swaps (July 02, 2002), 2002 TNT 148-34 (hereinafter “Talisman and Mikrut (2002)”).   
302 The periodic payments generally consist of a fixed number of basis points applied to a notional principal 
amount (equal to the Reference Obligation’s value at the time the CDS is entered into).  See Nirenberg and 
Kopp (1997). Normally, the Protection Buyer will stop making payments when the Default occurs, and in 
the absence of Default, will continue making the payments until maturity of the CDS. However, several 
other alternatives could be contemplated, including, for example, continuing making payment even after 
the Default. 
303 Id. Physical settlement generally reflects the net economics of cash settlement because the Protection 
Buyer is compensated for the reduction in the Reference Obligation’s value by allowing it to sell the 
Reference Obligation to the Protection Seller at par. In the event the Protection Buyer decides to deliver a 
different obligation, such a different obligation should approximate the post-Default amount of the 
Reference Obligation. See ISDA Comments, 2003 TNT 232-17.  
304 Frequently, a CDS will reference multiple obligations. The Protection Seller will pay the Protection 
Buyer in the event one or more of those Reference Obligations are in default, regardless of whether the 
Protection Buyer actually holds any of the defaulting obligations. See Bruce Kayle, Will the Real Lender 
Please Stand Up? The Federal Income Tax Treatment of Credit Derivative Transactions, 50 TAX LAW. 561 
(1997), at note 12 (hereinafter “Kayle”). In addition, some CDS contracts allow either the Protection Buyer 
or the Protection Seller to add or remove a Reference Obligation or obligor from the application of the 
contract.  See ISDA Offers Treasury Documents on Treatment of Credit Default Swaps (November 21, 
2003), 2003 TNT 232-17 (hereinafter “ISDA Comments 2003”).  
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risk associated with holding the Reference Obligation; (ii) a trader or investor with a 
portfolio of less risky obligations can become a Protection Seller in order to enhance the 
yield on that portfolio (at the cost of undertaking additional risk); or (iii) a trader or 
investor can use a CDS, either as a Protection Buyer or Protection Seller, to take a 
synthetic long or short position with respect to a Reference Obligation as part of its 
overall strategy of trying to maximize returns.305 
In regard to the cross-border aspects of CDSs, the IRS raised two questions in Notice 
2004-52: (i) whether a payment to or from a foreign counterparty should be subject to 
withholding tax in the U.S., and (ii) whether entering into CDS contracts with U.S. 
counterparties could be construed as the conduct of a U.S. trade or business. In response 
to the IRS’s request for comments, several commentators have indicated that the same 
reasons that lead Congress to enact the securities trading exception and the source rules 
for periodic payments on notional principal contracts should apply to CDSs.306 
Accordingly, to allow domestic businesses more access to the CDSs markets, the U.S. 
should not withhold on payments on CDSs, and the foreign counterparties should not be 
deemed to have a U.S. trade or business because of their participating in the CDS 
markets.307 
305 See Garlock et. al. (2005).  
306 Id.  
307 Id.  
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IV. Harmful Tax Competition
A. Overview 
 
As discussed above, Professor Avi Yonah has cautioned in his influential article on 
globalization and tax competition that the enactment of the portfolio interest exemption in 
the United States in 1984 created a “race to the bottom” among nations.308 This “race to 
the bottom” among countries, according to Professor Avi Yonah, could be viewed as tax 
competition; not only source countries do not withhold on interest, but also residency 
countries do  not have the ability to levy their taxes on such income; interest income, 
therefore, escapes taxation by either the source country or the residency country.309 
Professor Avi Yonah wrote his article shortly after the issuance of the OECD Report 
(1998), which contains thoughtful analysis of the elements of international tax 
competition and what measurements should be taken by both OECD and non-OECD 
members to curb such competition.310 In 2000, the OECD issued a follow up report 
 
308 Avi Yonah (2000) at 1581.  
309 Id. at 1583-85.  
310 The OECD Report (1998) was approved by the OECD Council, with abstentions from Luxembourg 
and Switzerland, on 9 April 1998, and was presented to Ministers on 27/28 April 1998.The report 
addressed harmful tax practices in both member and non-member countries. Id. para 5.  
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which, among other things, identified several potentially harmful preferential tax 
regimes.”311 Both reports are discussed in greater detail below. 
 
B. The OECD Project on Harmful Tax Competition
1. General 
 
“A major contribution of the OECD Report is that it lists factors to be used in identifying 
tax havens.”312 While the report only addressed tax competition in OECD countries, it 
emphasized the need for dialog with non-OECD member countries.313 Paragraph 28 of 
the OECD Report (2000) elaborated that: 
 
Harmful tax competition is by its very nature a global phenomenon and 
there-fore its solution requires global endorsement and global 
participation. Countries outside the OECD must have a key role in this 
work since a number of them are either seriously affected by harmful tax 
practices or have potentially harmful regimes.       
 
311 See “Towards Global Tax Co-operation, Report To The 2000 Ministerial Council Meeting And 
Recommendations By The Committee on Fiscal Affairs” (OECD 2000) (Hereinafter “OECD Report 
(2000)”).  
312 Avi Yonah (2000) at 1659.  
313 See OECD Report (1998) para 13 (“The Committee recognises that since the problems discussed in this 
Report are of an inherently global nature, it is critical that as many countries as possible are involved in the 
dialogue. The broader the economic grouping of countries engaged in this dialogue, the greater the 
effectiveness of any solutions proposed, since this would minimise any displacement of activities to 
jurisdictions with harmful tax practices outside of the participating countries. Any displacement of 
activities may put more pressure on the implementation of counteracting measures if such activities are re-
established in jurisdictions which operate non-transparent harmful tax practices. It is for these reasons that 
the Committee has attached particular importance to associating non-member countries with its analytical 
and policy discussions on harmful tax competition.”). 
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Thus, the OECD project on harmful tax competition is expected to impact not only 
member states but also many other countries, developed and developing.314 Nevertheless, 
while the OECD Report (1998) focused on geographically mobile activities, such as 
financial and other service activities,315 it did not specifically address the issues of 
portfolio interest.316 
The OECD Report (1998) indicates that “tax havens” and “harmful preferential tax 
regimes” (see both definitions below) have the potential to cause harm by: 
 distorting financial and, indirectly, real investment flows; 
 undermining the integrity and fairness of tax structures; 
 discouraging compliance by all taxpayers; 
 re-shaping the desired level and mix of taxes and public spending; 
 causing undesired shifts of part of the tax burden to less mobile tax bases, 
such as labour, property and consumption; and 
 increasing the administrative costs and compliance burdens on tax 
authorities and taxpayers.317 
314 See OECD Report (2000), para 30 (“It is important to take forward the work of the Forum with regard to 
eliminating harmful tax practicess on a global basis. To this end, the Committee will encourage non-member 
economies to associate themselves with the 1998 Report and to agree to its principles; and hold regional 
seminars that will encourage and assist non-member economies to remove features of their preferential 
regimes that are potentially harmful.”).  
315 OECD Report (1998) para 6. 
316 Id .para 12.  
317 Id. para 30.  
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Thus, if a certain tax regime contains all these elements, it should be treated as 
“harmful.”318 Nevertheless, regimes that only contain some of these elements may be 
somewhere in the spectrum between being valid regimes or harmful tax regime.319 
The OECD Report (1998) distinguishes between three types of situations in which the tax 
levied in one country on income from mobile activities such as financial and other service 
activities is lower than the tax that would be levied on the same income in another 
country: 
1. Tax Havens - The first country is a tax haven and, as such, generally 
imposes no or only nominal tax on that income. 
2. Potentially Harmful Preferential Tax Regime - The first country collects 
significant revenues from tax imposed on income at the individual or 
corporate level but its tax system has preferential features that allow the 
relevant income to be subject to low or no taxation. 
3. Non-Harmful Tax Competition - The first country collects significant 
revenues from tax imposed on income at the individual or corporate level 
but the effective tax rate that is generally applicable at that level in that 
 
318 Id. para 31. 
319 Id.  In a study conducted four years later, the Cato Institute observed that “[o]f the six, it appears that at 
least four harms -- "distorting financial and, indirectly, real investment flows," "undermining the integrity 
and fairness of tax structures," "discouraging compliance by all taxpayers," and "increasing the 
administrative costs and compliance burdens on tax authorities and taxpayers" -- are probably more true of 
high-tax regimes. The fifth harm cited is hollow bureaucrat-speak: "re-shaping the desired level and mix of 
taxes and public spending." The sixth harm -- "causing undesired shifts of part of the tax burden to less 
mobile tax bases, such as labour, property and consumption" -- gets it backwards. The last effect is a 
desired and expected shift in a globalized economy.” See Cato Study on International Tax Competition, 
2002 TNT 85-51.  
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country is lower than that levied in the second country.320 
The OECD Report (1998) does not deal with the third category (which is therefore not 
discussed in this article), and distinguishes between the first category (“tax havens”), and 
the second category (“potentially harmful preferential tax regimes.”)321 
2. Tax Havens 
 
A tax regime could be considered a “tax haven” if: (a) it imposes no or only 
nominal taxes and offers itself, or is perceived to offer itself, as a place to be used by non-
residents to escape tax in their residency country; (b) its laws or administrative practices 
prevent the effective exchange of relevant information with other governments on 
taxpayers benefiting from the low or no tax jurisdiction; (c) its laws lack transparency 
and (d) it has no requirement that the activity be substantial (which would suggest that it 
attempts to attract investment or transactions that are purely tax driven.322 
This article does not endorse adopting any of these elements. Thus, my proposed 
residency-based regime for financial transactions should not result in Country D being 
treated as a tax haven under the above standards. The remainder of this part will focus 
only the second category (i.e., the “potentially harmful preferential tax regimes.”).   
3. Potentially Harmful Preferential Tax Regimes. 
 
320 Id. para 38.  
321 Id. para 44.  
322 Id. para 52.  
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Pursuant to paragraph 59 of the OECD Report (1998), there are four key factors that 
assist in identifying harmful preferential tax regimes: (a) the regime imposes low or zero 
effective tax rate on the relevant income; (b) the regime is “ring-fenced”; (c) the 
operation of the regime is non-transparent; and (d) the jurisdiction does not effectively 
exchange information with other countries.323 
A harmful preferential tax regime exists only where the relevant income is subject to low 
or zero effective tax rate (The first factor) and one or more the other factors also exists.324 
While my proposal would probably satisfy the first factor because I suggest eliminating 
source-based taxation on several types of passive income, Country D could easily avoid 
becoming a harmful preferential tax regime by making sure that it would not fall under 
any of the other three factors, as discussed below.325 
“Ring-fencing” includes: (i) exclusions of residents from taking advantage of the 
regime’s tax benefits, and (ii) prohibiting enterprises which benefit from the regime from 
operating in the domestic market.326 
“Non-transparency” includes: (i) favorable application of laws and regulations, (ii) 
negotiable tax provisions, and (iii) a failure to make widely available administrative 
 
323 Id. para 59. 
324 Id.  
325 Other less important factors identified by the OECD Report (1998) include: (i) an artificial definition of 
the tax base; (ii) a failure to adhere to international transfer pricing principles; (iii) the exemption of foreign 
source income from tax; (iv) a negotiable tax rate or base; (v) secrecy provisions such as bank secrecy laws 
or bearer debt; (vi) membership in a wide network of tax treaties; (vii) self-promotion as tax minimisation 
vehicles; and (viii) the encouragement of tax-driven operations. See Avi Yonah (2000) at 1660, quoting 
from the OECD Report (1998), para 68-79. 
326 OECD Report (1998), para 62.  
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practices.327 
Finally, the lack of effective exchange of information in relation to taxpayers benefiting 
from the operation of a preferential tax regime is also a strong indication that a country is 
“potentially harmful preferential tax regimes.”328 
In my view, there is no reason why Country D would not be able to avoid all of these 
three conditions. In fact, as illustrated in Table 3 below, many countries including the 
U.S. that provide for preferential treatment of income from financial transaction (i.e., fall 
under condition number 1) have been able to avoid being classified by the OECD as  
“potentially harmful preferential tax regimes.”     
 
4. The OECD Follow-up Report (2000) 
 
In 2000, the OECD issued a follow up report which, among other things, identified 
several potentially harmful preferential tax regimes.”329 As illustrated by Table 3, the list 
of such potentially harmful preferential tax regimes does not include the United States or 
any other jurisdiction solely because it applies any of the three proposals discussed in this 
article.330 Furthermore, as of today, none of such practices has been defined as creating a 
potential for harmful tax competition.        
 
327 Id. para 63.  
328 Id. para 64. 
329 See OECD Report 2000, para 10.  
330 Id. para 10-11. 
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Table 3
Insurance 
Finland Aland Captive Insurance Regime 
Italy Trieste Financial Services and Insurance Centre 
Ireland International Financial Services Centre 
Portugal Madeira International Business Centre 
Luxembourg Provisions for Fluctuations in Re-Insurance Companies 
Sweden Foreign Non-life Insurance Companies 
Australia           Offshore banking units 
Belgium            Coordination centers 
 
Financing and Leasing 
 
Belgium Co-ordination Centres 
Hungary Venture Capital Companies 
Hungary Preferential Regime for Companies Operating Abroad 
Iceland International Trading Companies 
Ireland International Financial Services Centre 
Ireland Shannon Airport Zone 
Italy Trieste Financial Services and Insurance Centre 
Luxembourg Finance Branch 
Netherlands Risk Reserves for International Group Financing 
Netherlands Intra-group Finance Activities 
Netherlands Finance Branch 
Spain Basque Country and Navarra Co-ordination Centres 
Switzerland Administrative Companies 
 
Fund Managers 
 
Greece Mutual Funds/Portfolio Investment Companies [Taxation of Fund 
Managers] 
Ireland   International Financial Services Centre [Taxation of Fund Managers] 
Luxembourg Management companies [Taxation of management companies that 
manage only one mutual fund (1929 holdings)] 
Portugal    Madeira International Business Centre [Taxation of Fund Managers] 
 
Banking 
 
Australia Offshore Banking Units 
Canada International Banking Centres 
Ireland International Financial Services Centre 
Italy Trieste Financial Services and Insurance Centre 
Korea Offshore Activities of Foreign Exchange Banks 
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Portugal External Branches in the Madeira International Business Centre 
Turkey Istanbul Offshore Banking Regime 
Headquarters regimes 
 
Belgium Co-ordination Centres 
France Headquarters Centres 
Germany Monitoring and Co-ordinating Offices 
Greece Offices of Foreign Companies 
Netherlands Cost-plus Ruling 
Portugal Madeira International Business Centre 
Spain Basque Country and Navarra Co-ordination Centres 
Switzerland Administrative Companies 
Switzerland Service Companies 
 
Distribution Centre Regimes 
 
Belgium Distribution Centres 
France Logistics Centres 
Netherlands Cost-plus/Resale Minus Ruling 
Turkey Turkish Free Zones 
 
Service Centre Regimes 
 
Belgium Service Centres 
Netherlands Cost-plus Ruling 
 
Shipping 
 
Canada International Shipping 
Germany International Shipping 
Greece Shipping Offices 
Greece Shipping Regime (Law 27/75) 
Italy International Shipping 
Netherlands International Shipping 
Norway International Shipping 
Portugal International Shipping Register of Madeira 
 
Miscellaneous Activities 
 
Belgium Ruling on Informal Capital 
Belgium Ruling on Foreign Sales Corporation Activities 
Canada Non-resident Owned Investment Corporations 
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Netherlands Ruling on Informal Capital 
Netherlands Ruling on Foreign Sales Corporation Activities 
United States Foreign Sales Corporations 
 
C. Conclusions
In conclusion, my proposed regime for Country D should not constitute “harmful tax 
competition” for several reasons. First, as discussed above, taxation of passive income by 
the residency country rather than the source country is consistent with the principles set 
forth by the League of Nations in both the 1923 report and the 1928 treaty model. This 
regime is an integral part of the “international tax regime” and has become so 
fundamental in domestic laws as well as tax treaties, that it is hard to classify it as a 
“harmful” regime. 
 
Second, as set forth above, the OECD Report (1998) contains several elements the 
existence of which could result in classifying the tested tax regime as potential harmful 
preferential tax regime.  The list included four facts and the existence of the first one plus 
any of the other three could result in classifying the tax regime as a potential harmful 
preferential tax regime. Nevertheless, in my view, while country D would most likely 
satisfy the first prong, it could easily avoid falling under any of the other three elements. 
My recommendation, of course, would be to ensure that none of these three elements 
exist in Country D.  
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Third, the portfolio interest exemption has never been described by the OECD as creating 
harmful tax competition.331 Furthermore, the OECD Report (2000), which identified 
various tax regimes as tax havens or potential harmful preferential tax regimes, has not 
identified any of the three proposals set forth in this article as creating harmful tax 
competition.   
 
Finally, the OECD Report (1998) acknowledged that developing countries may have 
valid reasons to provide tax incentives to foreign investors even if such policy may be 
viewed as engaging in tax competition.332 Specifically, the OECD Report (1998) stated 
that “countries with specific structural disadvantages, such as poor geographical location, 
lack of natural resources, etc., frequently consider that special tax incentives or tax 
regimes are necessary to offset non-tax disadvantages, including any additional cost from 
locating in such areas.”333 
331 See Marshall J. Langer, Harmful Tax Competition: Who are the Real Tax Havens?, 2001 TNT 19-66 
(Jan. 05, 2001) (reviewing “Towards Global Tax Co-operation” (OECD 2000) and arguing that the 
portfolio interest exemption should be viewed as an attribute of harmful tax competition).   
332 OECD Report (1998) para 27. 
333 Id. See also Avi Yonah (2000) at 1639-48.  
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V. Conclusions 
 
Developing countries typically struggle between the need to raise tax revenue and the 
need to attract foreign investors.334 The decision is even harder in the case of financial 
investments that are not only highly mobile but also sensitive to taxation. Withholding 
taxes has the same effect of tariffs by virtue of raising the domestic costs of capital.335 
As this article illustrates, residency-based taxation for financial transaction is 
recommended to developing countries for the following reasons: (i) globalization and 
mobility of capital, (ii) harmonization of the tax system with that existing in developed 
countries and participating in tax treaties, and (iii) promoting equity, efficiency and 
simplicity. 
 
My proposed regime will speed up Country D’s integration in the globalization process, 
which in itself has an impact on the size and composition of the public’s financial asset 
portfolio and capital movements. As a practical matter, Country D can learn from other 
countries’ experience and adopt rules that are consistent with common practices in the tax 
 
334 See, generally, Avi Yonah (2000) at 1639-48.  
335 Merrill et. al. at 1388-9 (“A country that  imposes withholding taxes and other barriers to the 
importation of capital will restrict domestic investment, thereby lowering labor productivity and wages. 
Thus, for the same reason that countries have sought tariff reductions through the GATT and free trade 
agreements, it generally is in every country's self interest to seek reciprocal elimination of withholding 
taxes.”).   
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and accounting arenas in major developed countries. Such consistency will enhance 
Country D’s role in the process of globalization of capital markets. 
 
Furthermore, residency-based taxation in general and for financial transactions in 
particular has been praised as a method to promote equity and efficiency. Equity is 
promoted because residency-based taxation reflects better the ability to pay principle. 
Such a regime would also be efficient since it will minimize the tax system’s impact on 
investment decisions by reducing the distortions caused by the tax system.336 
In addition, residency-based taxation will reduce compliance costs, since the source-
based taxation on interest and dividend income earned by nonresidents is very impractical 
in many instances.  Residence-based taxation, however, would shift revenue from 
developing to developed countries in the short-run, but as discussed in this article, it 
would benefit Country D in the long-run. 
 
336 See Rosenbloom (1996) (“Financial market participants often inveigh against source taxation, 
particularly source taxation on a gross basis, on the ground that such taxation interferes with marketplace 
efficiency.”) 
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Appendix: The Tax Reform in Israel (2002) 
 
On July 24, 2002, the Israeli Parliament amended the Income Tax Ordinance (“ITO”), 
effective from January 1, 2003, in accordance with the recommendations of the 
Rabinowitz Committee for Income Tax Reform.337 The reform’s major task was to revise 
the taxation rules for financial instruments, in order to enhance Israel’s competitiveness 
in global financial markets. The reform is discussed below.              
 
The major achievements of the reform are as follows. First, The Reform added new ITO 
section 4A, which adopted source rules that are similar to those contained in most 
developed countries, and in most treaties.338 Second, Israel adopted a residency-based 
taxation regime that is consistent with the “international tax regime.”339 Third, the reform 
(and subsequent regulations) modernized the rules pertaining to financial transaction and 
added rules pertaining to debt and equity, derivatives, short sales, hedging and more. 
Fourth, Israel adopted several tax measurements to attract foreign investors.  
 
In particular, most types of interest income are now taxed as ordinary income at reduced 
rates.340 Furthermore, dividend income is generally subject to flat and reduced rates.341 
337 Law for the Amendment of the Income Tax Ordinance (No. 132) 2002. See generally, Keinan and 
Menuchin (2003), and Gross, New Income Tax Laws, 3rd Edition (2003), at 376. 
338 Particularly, the source of interest is the debtor’s place of residency and the source of dividend is the 
payor’s place of residency. 
339 The reform opted for personal taxation for the following reasons: globalization, mobility of capital, 
harmonization of the tax system with that existing in developed countries, participation in tax treaties, and 
lack of economic logic inherent in the territorial method. 
340 The Reform introduced reduced rates (10 - 15 percent) for interest received by individuals. Interest 
income received by corporations remains subject to the general corporate rate of 36 percent.  
341 Pursuant to ITO section 125B, the rate is 25 percent for dividends received by individuals on 
domestically traded stock. For dividends on stock traded overseas, the rate for individuals is 35 percent 
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As to capital gains upon sales of securities, individuals and corporations are generally 
subject to capital gains tax on the sale or exchange of tradable securities and derivatives, 
Foreign investors are exempt from capital gains tax on the sale or exchange of shares 
traded on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (“TASE”). While the general capital gains tax 
rate is 25 percent, the capital gain rate for sale or exchange of securities traded on the 
TASE is 15 percent for indexed securities and 10 percent for unindexed securities, 
provided that the holder deducted no financing expenses and that the sale is not to a 
related party.  
 
The reform and subsequent regulations also established basic timing and character rules 
pertaining to derivative transactions.342 Under the new rules, a sale, exchange, or 
retirement of a position in a derivative is subject to the capital gains tax. As to timing, the 
regulations adopted a “wait and see” approach for derivatives; the gain or loss is not 
realized until the taxpayer disposes of the underlying asset.  The reform, however, did not 
establish source rules for payments under derivative instruments.  
 
Finally, ITO section 105K defines a hedging transaction as a forward transaction that an 
investor enters into for the protection of the value of an existing or future asset or 
obligation, provided that the transaction is identified. The ITO grants the Minister of 
 
until the end of 2006, and 25 percent beginning January 1, 2007. Corporations are subject to a 25 percent 
rate on dividends, regardless of where the stock is traded.  
342 ITO section 105K defines options, forward, and futures contracts together as an obligation or right, to 
deliver or receive, in the future, an amount equal to the differences in the value of a foreign currency, 
index, interest, property, and property’s price, at a specified price, quantity and delivery date, including 
short sales. 
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Finance the authority to issue regulations for hedging that have yet to be issued. The 
definition does not include notional principal contracts; although options, forwards and 
futures are commonly used for hedging, hedging rules would clearly be incomplete 
without rules for notional principal contracts.   
 
In conclusion, the reform was the first step in shaping modern tax rules for financial 
instruments. Nevertheless, the work is incomplete; many gaps in the current rules still 
exist. For example, there are no current rules for hedging transactions in general, and for 
notional principal contracts in particular. Some of those gaps are scheduled to be 
corrected in the coming years, with regulations to be issued by the Minister of Finance. In 
addition, some rules, such as the definition of options, forwards and futures, are 
inconsistent with those prevailing in other developed countries. 
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